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IX

JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Utah Real Estate Brokers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 et

seq. ("UREBA"), bars the claims of Appellee Ira Sachs ("Sachs") presented in the case
below. This is a legal issue that this Court reviews for correctness, according no
deference to the Utah Court of Appeals' decision. Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St.
Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1994).
2.

Whether the Utah Statute of Frauds bars the claims Sachs presented in the

case below. This is a legal issue that this Court reviews for correctness, according no
deference to the Utah Court of Appeals' decision. Id.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
The following rules and statutes are determinative or of central importance to this
appeal:
1.

Utah Real Estate Brokers Act ("UREBA"), Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 et

seq. (2005), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
2.

Utah Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (2004), a copy of which

is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
3.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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4.

Utah Admin. Code R. 162-1-2 (1.2.24) (2007), a copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit D.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case.
Sachs alleges that he entered into a contract implied in fact or at law with

appellants Joseph S. Lesser ("Lesser"), Loeb Investors Co. XL ("Loeb") and United Park
City Mines Company ("UPCM") (collectively "Appellants") to find a purchaser for
UPCM, whose only assets of any significance were its 8,300 acres of real property
located in Summit and Wasatch Counties and its entitlements to develop two real estate
projects known as Flagstaff Mountain and Bonanza Flats. Sachs further alleges that he
"found" Gerald Jackson ("Jackson"), a real estate developer, who formed Capital Growth
Partners, LLC (Capital Growth") to purchase UPCM. Finally, Sachs alleges that
Appellants breached the alleged finder's fee agreement when they refused to pay him a
finder's fee after Capital Growth purchased all of UPCM's outstanding common stock.
Appellants dispute that an implied finder's fee agreement ever existed, but even
assuming Sachs could prove the existence of an implied finder's fee agreement, his
claims are unenforceable because he was not a licensed real estate broker in Utah. Under
UREBA, an unlicensed person may not maintain an action to recover a finder's fee with
respect to "real estate" transactions, which, by definition, include "business opportunities
involving real estate."
The Utah Statute of Frauds also bars Sachs' claims because the parties never
entered into an express finder's fee agreement. Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, a
DMWEST #6563115 v1
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finder's fee agreement is void as a matter of law unless reflected in a writing, signed by
the party to be charged.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts.
On January 26, 2005, Sachs filed his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

("Complaint"). (R. 1-27.) The Complaint alleges the following five Counts: (a) Count IDeclaratory Judgment; (b) Count II-Breach of Contract; (c) Count Ill-Quantum MeruitContract Implied in Law; (d) Count IV-Quantum Meruit-Contract Implied in Fact; and
(e) Count V-Intentional Interference with Economic Relations. (R. 16-21.)
On March 31, 2005, Loeb and Lesser filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
("Loeb Motion") seeking to dismiss Sachs' claims on the grounds that: (1) no express or
implied finder's fee agreement was ever made; (2) Sachs' claims were barred because he
did not have a real estate license; (3) Sachs' claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds;
and (4) Sachs failed to state a claim for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations. (R. 1082-84.) On April 8, 2005, UPCM filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of all five Counts against UPCM alleged in the
Complaint on the same grounds. ("UPCM Motion"). (R. 1206-1208.)
The trial court heard oral argument on the UPCM Motion and the Loeb Motion on
December 12, 2005. On February 6, 2006, the trial court issued its Minute Entry
Decision granting the Motions in their entirety. (R. 2208-12.) The trial court held,
among other things, that Sachs' claims are barred by UREBA as a matter of law because:
(1) it is undisputed that Sachs did not have a real estate license; (2) UPCM's principal
business was the leasing, development and sale of real property; (3) UPCM's only asset
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o f significance was its real property; and (4) Utah law requires a real estate license to
recover a finder's fee in connection with the sale of "real estate" which, by statutory
definition, includes "business opportunities involving real estate." (R. at 2208-12.)
The trial court also ruled that Sachs' contract and quantum meruit claims are
barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds as a matter of law because: (1) it is undisputed that
the alleged finder's fee agreement relates to the sale or purchase of real estate as the only
significant asset owned by UPCM; (2) it is undisputed that no writing exists that would
satisfy the requirements of the Utah Statute of Frauds; and (3) quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment claims cannot rescue claims otherwise precluded by the Utah Statute of
Frauds.1 (R. at 2208-12.)
The trial court entered an Order Granting the Motions for Summary Judgment on
February 15, 2006 ("Final Judgment") and dismissed Sachs' claims with prejudice. (R.
2213-22.)2
Sachs filed his Notice of Appeal on March 16, 2006. (R. 2224-25.) The appeal
was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on March 23, 2006. (R. 2228.) The Utah
Court of Appeals heard oral argument on March 26, 2007.

1

The trial court also ruled that Sachs' claim for intentional interference with
prospective and economic relations fails as a matter of law. Sachs did not appeal that
ruling.
The trial court had previously granted Capital Growth's motion for
summary judgment and dismissed all of Sachs' claims against Capital Growth with
prejudice on September 13, 2005. Sachs did not appeal that ruling.
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On May 17, 2007, the Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion affirming in part
and reversing and remanding in part. (Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 UT App 169, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit E). Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's ruling that Sachs' express contract claim failed as a matter of law because
there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term of the fee to be paid. (Sachs,
2007 UT App 169, Tf 1). The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that
Sachs' implied contract claims also failed as a matter of law on the ground that, when
viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to Sachs, there were disputed issues of fact as to who was responsible for
procuring a buyer for UPCM. (Sachs, 2007 UT App 169, U 32). The Utah Court of
Appeals further determined that UREBA and the Statute of Frauds do not bar Appellee's
claims and, accordingly, remanded Appellee's implied contract claim to the trial court.
(Sachs, 2007 UT App 169,1142, 52, 54).
III.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Sachs is a resident of Park City, Utah, and was a shareholder of UPCM

prior to June, 2003. (R. at 2, 1114, 1141.)
2.

Loeb is a New York partnership with its principal place of business in New

York, New York. (R. at 2, 1114.) At all relevant times, Loeb owned a controlling
interest in UPCM. (R. at 4, 1114.) Lesser is the managing partner of Loeb. Lesser is the
former chairman of UPCM's Board of Directors. (R. at 2, 1114.)
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3.

UPCM is a Delaware corporation whose "principal business . . . is the

leasing, development and sale of real property located in or near Park City, Utah." (R. at
2-3,1114-15.)
4.

UPCM owns the surface estate to more than 8,300 acres of land, of which

approximately 5,300 acres are leased to Deer Valley and the Park City Mountain Resort
for skiing and related purposes. (R. at 3, 1115.) This real property, including the
entitlements to develop it, is UPCM's "only asset of any significance whatsoever." (R. at
1210,1257.)
5.

In or around 1999, UPCM was in the process of developing two real estate

projects known as the Flagstaff Mountain Resort Project in Summit County and the
Bonanza Mountain Resort Project in Wasatch County (collectively the "Projects"). (R. at
3-4, 1115, 1210.)3
6.

In early 2001, an article appeared in the Park Record newspaper that

discussed the failure of a joint venture between UPCM and DMB Associates, Inc.
("DMB") to develop the Projects. (R. at 5, 1211, 1255.)
7.

Sachs understood from reading the newspaper article that "it was apparent

that someone would come in and pick up the ball" for development of the Projects. (R. at
1211,1267.)

3

UPCM's hard-fought efforts to develop the Flagstaff Mountain Resort Project
are chronicled in this Court's decision in United Park City Mines, Co. v. Stichting
Mayflower Mountain Fond, 2006 UT 35, 140 P.3d 1200.
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8.

Upon learning that a joint venture for development of the Projects had

failed, Sachs contacted Hank Rothwell ("Rothwell"), president of UPCM, because Sachs
thought the Granite Land Company ("Granite"), which had an established business
relationship with Sachs, would be a "natural partner" with UPCM in a joint venture to
develop the Projects. (R. at 5, 1116, 1211.)
9.

In March 2001, Sachs arranged a meeting between UPCM and Granite to

discuss a potential joint venture. (R. at 1116, 1144, 1211.) At the time he arranged the
meeting, Sachs understood, based on his conversations with Rothwell, that UPCM was
"interested in selling . . . all or part of [UPCM]" and that UPCM was "hopeful that
Granite might purchase all or part of it." (R. at 1212, 1264, 1266-67.)
10.

During the meeting, a finder's fee was never discussed. (R. at 1116, 1145-

46.) In fact, Sachs admits he never had any direct discussions with Rothwell or anyone
else at UPCM about his purported interest in getting paid a finder's fee by UPCM in
connection with a possible transaction with Granite. (R. at 1213, 1270, 1280-81.)
11.

Sachs also arranged a meeting with Lesser to discuss a potential joint

venture between Granite and UPCM. (R. at 5, 1117, 1171-72, 1175-76, 1181, 1212,
1269, 2042, 2048, 2098-99.)
12.

On May 2, 2001, Sachs, Lesser and Lesser's business associate met for

lunch in New York City. (R. at 5, 1117, 1150, 1177, 1212.)
13.

Sachs claims that during the lunch meeting, Lesser requested that he locate

a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM. (R. at 5-6.)
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14.

Sachs and Lesser did not discuss a finder's fee during the lunch. (R. at

1117-18, 1153,1213.)
15.

On May 17, 2001, upon the advice of his attorney, Sachs sent a letter to

Rothwell stating as follows:
I am delighted that my introducing United Park
City Mines to Granite Land Company appears to be
heading in the right direction and I am pleased that the
confidentiality letter has been signed. I certainly will
continue to do everything in my power to bring
together a mutually satisfactory agreement between
these two parties. I took the opportunity to express
this commitment to your chairman, Joe Lessor [sic],
when he invited me to lunch at the Sky 8 Room in
New York in early May.
I perceive this venture as joining two entities
with the potential of creating one of the nation's
premier skiing and real estate developments. In other
words, I think that both parties are in the right place at
the right time. I hope you agree.
In that lunch with Joe Lessor [sic], I was
delighted to find that he seems to share our enthusiasm
for this joint venture. I hope that this feeling is
generally shared by the rest of your board. Most
potential JV land development partners would still
require Granite Construction to do the development
infrastructure. This JV partner comes with that
compatibility. Joe gave me his encouragement to "get
the job done."
I write this letter to remind you that I will
expect a modest finder's fee if an agreement comes to
fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime
developed lots in the new project, or some other
consideration acceptable to both of us. While I believe
that we have an understanding as to this finder's fee, I
do think that matters of this sort ought to be out on the
table early on, and I hope that you feel the same.
DMWEST #6563115 v1
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Please let me know if you have any questions
about such a finder's fee.
I look forward to continuing our quest to link
these two parties for everyone's benefit, including the
shareholders who overwhelming [sic] expressed their
approval.
( R a t 1118, 1195, 1213.)
16.

Sachs never discussed the specific amount of a finder's fee with Lesser,

Rothwell or anyone affiliated with UPCM. (R. at 6, 1213.) Sachs also admits that
neither Lesser nor anyone else affiliated with Loeb ever told Sachs that he would be paid
a finder's fee for finding a buyer. (R. at 1119, 1157.)
17.

Sachs claims that on May 18, 2001, after receiving his letter of May 17,

2001, Lesser called him and stated that he was no longer interested in a joint venture and
that he wanted UPCM sold. (R. at 1119, 1155-56.)
18.

On May 18, 2001, Sachs wrote a letter to Rothwell stating:
I understand, after a conversation yesterday
with Lessor [sic], that his preference would be to sell
the company rather than enter into a joint venture. I
had referred to a joint venture in yesterday's letter
because I had understood that you would consider such
a proposition (and that is obviously what Granite
seeks), and because a joint venture purchaser might
also work for everyone.
Happily, if your company's preference is sale
[sic], Granite, as I suggested in yesterday's letter, is
still an excellent prospect. Another investor, together
with Granite, would make an excellent purchaser. I
am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such a
joint venture purchaser.
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( R a t 1119, 1196.)
19.

Rothwell never responded to Sachs' letters of May 17 and 18, 2001. (R. at

1214, 1277.)
20.

The contemplated agreement with Granite referenced in Sachs' letters of

May 17 and 18, 2001, never came to fruition. (R. at 1120, 1192, 1214, 1277.)
21.

On June 2, 2001, an article appeared in the Park Record entitled "Merger

Rumblings Heard at UPCM." The article stated that UPCM "was exploring strategies to
raise money in order to fund the construction of [the Projects]" including "a sale or
exchange of UPCM's capital stock, assets, projects or business to one or more parties...."
(R. at 1214, 1267, 1285.)
22.

Sachs first contacted Jackson regarding UPCM the same week the article

appeared in the Park Record. (R. at 7, 1214, 1273.)
23.

When Sachs contacted Jackson, Jackson already knew that UPCM was for

sale through discussions he had had with Rothwell, his long-time friend, and through the
newspaper articles in the Park Record. (R. at 1120, 1169, 1198, 1214.)
24.

On June 4, 2001, Sachs sent Jackson a facsimile coversheet regarding "JV

Granite Const" requesting that Jackson call him "after your talk with Hank Rothwell."
(R. at 1215, 1287.)
25.

Sachs continued to contact Jackson regarding Jackson's contemplated

purchase of UPCM. (R. at 9, 1120.)
26.

After June 4, 2001, Sachs called Jackson on several occasions to inquire

about Jackson's negotiations with UPCM. Jackson testified that "Sachs called . . . so
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many times that it was a nuisance [but I] was not going to share any information with
him." In fact, Jackson viewed Sachs as an outsider to the entire transaction. (R. at 205657,2138-39.)
27.

Although Sachs was represented by counsel at the time, he did not send

UPCM, Lesser or Loeb a letter or any other document indicating that he considered
Jackson to be his "client" or that he expected to receive a finder's fee in the event of a
transaction between UPCM and Jackson. (R. at 1974.)
28.

On February 21, 2002, Capital Growth, a new company that Jackson helped

form, formally offered to purchase UPCM for approximately $81.3 million. (R. at 11,
1215.)
29.

Sachs never attended any meetings between UPCM and Jackson, was never

asked to sign a confidentiality agreement with UPCM and never participated in any
negotiations with UPCM. In fact, Sachs learned of Capital Growth's agreement to
purchase UPCM like the rest of the world, through a newspaper article. (R. at 1977,
2021-22.)
30.

On February 23, 2002, the Salt Lake Tribune published an article regarding

Capital Growth's proposed purchase of UPCM. (R. at 1215, 1279, 1288.)
31.

The day after the article appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, Sachs sent a fax

to Roth well regarding "completion of task." This was the first time Sachs notified
UPCM that he considered Jackson to be his "client." (R. at 1215, 1279, 1289.)
32.

According to Sachs, between June 2001 and February 2002, the "only"

thing he did to find a purchaser for UPCM "was make periodic telephone calls" to
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Jackson. (R. at 1215, 1279.) Sachs spent no more than ten hours total attempting to find
a buyer for UPCM. (R. at 1121,1159.)
33.

On or about June 16, 2003, UPCM and Capital Growth completed a revised

merger whereby UPCM became a wholly owned subsidiary of Capital Growth. Capital
Growth paid approximately $67.2 million for UPCM's shares. (R. at 14, 1215.)
34.

On August 19, 2003, Rothwell sent Sachs a facsimile staling that:
Ira-United Park does not agree with your agency argument.
Gerry [Jackson] and I had discussed UP for years! We
viewed you as a representative of Granite Construction only!

(R. at 1452, 2062.)
35.

Sachs did not have a Utah real estate license at any relevant time. Sachs'

real estate license in New York lapsed at least 15 to 20 years ago. (R. at 1121, 1162.)
36.

Sachs has never held a license to sell securities. (R. at 1162.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Sachs' claims are now based entirely upon an alleged implied finder's fee
agreement to locate a purchaser for UPCM. By his complaint, Sachs seeks a three
percent (3%) commission of UPCM's $67.2 million sale price. The Court should reverse
the court of appeal's decision because Sachs' claims are barred as a matter of law by
UREBA and the Utah Statute of Frauds.
Sachs was not licensed to sell real estate at any relevant time. The principal
business of UPCM was the leasing, development, and sale of real property located in or
near Park City, Utah, and this real property was UPCM's only asset of any significance.
UREBA specifically precludes the recovery of compensation for finding a buyer of a
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business whose assets consist of real estate. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14) ("real estate'
includes 'business opportunities involving real estate'"). Moreover, contrary to the
decision of the court of appeals, the transaction at issue was a business opportunity
involving real estate.
The alleged finder's fee agreement was not in writing. Therefore, Sachs' claims
also are barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 ("every
agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation" must be in writing). Because the relevant portions of the statute of frauds
and UREBA relate to the same class of persons and things, and have the same basic
purpose, these statutes should be construed to be in pari materia and construed with
reference to one another and harmonized if possible.
Because the statute of frauds does not define "real estate," it is appropriate to refer
to the definition of "real estate" contained in UREBA, thereby harmonizing the statute of
frauds with UREBA. Applying this definition, Sachs' claims barred.
ARGUMENT
I.

Utah's Real Estate Broker Act Bars Unlicensed "Finders" of Business
Opportunities Involving Real Property from Bringing Actions for
Commissions.
UREBA specifically provides that "[n]o person may bring or maintain an

action in any court... for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any
act . .. which is prohibited under this chapter . .. unless the person was duly
licensed . . . at the time." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (2003).
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UREBA further precludes an unlicensed person from acting in the capacity
of a "principal real estate broker," id § 61-2-1. A principal real estate broker includes
any person who, inter alia, "sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, or auctions real
estate," id. § 61-2-2(12)(a), or who "assists or directs in the procurement of prospects"
for the transfer of real estate.4
"Real estate" is, in turn, defined expansively to include "leaseholds and
business opportunities involving real property." Id. § 61-2-2(14). There is no de
minimus exception: "one a c t . . . requires the person . . . to be licensed." IdL § 61-2-4.
Sachs contends that Appellants promised him an unspecified commission
for finding a buyer for UPCM, a company whose only significant asset was
approximately 8,300 acres of land in and around Park City, Utah.5 (R. at 2-3, 1114-15,
1210, 1257.) Sachs alleges that he was the procuring cause of UPCM's sale. (R. at 1215,
1279, 1288.) That sale, the terms of which were negotiated and concluded without
Sachs' involvement, was consummated as corporate merger, in which Capital Growth
purchased all outstanding shares of UPCM's common stock. (R. at 14, 1215.) It is

4

In Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848 (Utah
1978), this Court held that UREBA applies to those who perform the ads described in
UREBA, regardless of whether they are "brokers," or "finders." A person whose sole
responsibility is to "locate a buyer for the property and bring him to" the seller "fall[s]
precisely within the statutory definition of a real estate broker." 584 P.2d at 849, 852.
5

While Appellants dispute Sachs' contract, promissory estoppel/reliance, and
implied contract claims on multiple grounds, the writ of certiorari did not include those
issues.
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undisputed that Sachs never held a real estate broker license in Utah or anywhere else.
(R. at 1121, 1162.)
In reversing the trial court's conclusion that Sachs' claims were barred
because he was unlicensed at the time he allegedly found the buyer, the Court of Appeals
held that the term "business opportunities involving real property" does not apply to (1)
existing, ongoing businesses, nor to (2) transactions involving the sale of stock. Sachs v.
Lesser, 2007 UT App 169,ffif39-42, 44 n.21, 46-48, 163 P.3d 662.
In arriving at its erroneous interpretation, the Court of Appeals (1) violated
elementary rules of statutory construction by allowing its analysis of UREBA's plain
language to be influenced by its erroneous view of the legislative history; (2) in the
process, relied on an incomplete record of UREBA's legislative history; (3) prioritized its
conclusion about the historical place of corporations at the expense of the legislature's
expressed intent; (4) ignored the Real Estate Commission's considered interpretation of
the term "business opportunity," even though the Commission is authorized to
promulgate regulations interpreting UREBA; (5) relied upon cases from other
jurisdictions that interpreted statutes distinctly different than UREBA and simultaneously
dismissed case law from jurisdictions whose real estate broker statutes closely parallel
UREBA; (6) delivered an interpretation of UREBA that renders statutory terms
superfluous; and (7) interpreted UREBA in a manner that subverts the statute's essential
purpose. Each of these reversible errors is discussed below.
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11.

The Ordinary Meaning of "Business Opportunities Involving Real Property"
Includes the Transaction at Issue.
The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the phrase "business

opportunities involving real property" is ambiguous. A construction "according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning," Utah State Bar v. Summerhayes & Hayden, 905 P.2d
867, 871 (Utah 1995), demonstrates the phrase is not "susceptible to two interpretations,"
Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City. 2007 UT 57, % 69, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41.
Utah courts are required to interpret statutory terms "according to the
context and the approved usage of the language." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11; see also
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs.. Inc.. 2001 UT 29,1f 12-13, 24 P.3d 928. However,
"technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar
and appropriate meaning or definition." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11. Additionally, the
Utah legislature has provided default definitions for certain regularly used terms,
including the terms "'[l]and,' 'real estate,' and 'real property.'" Utah Code Ann. § 68-312. For purposes of the default definitions, these three terms are synonymous, meaning
"land, tenements, hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims." Id. § 68-312(2)(k). These default definitions are controlling unless they are "inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the Legislature . . . or repugnant to the context of the statute." Id. § 683-12(2).
UREBA, however, expands the definition of "real estate" to "include[]
leaseholds and business opportunities involving real property." Utah Code Ann. §61-2-
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2. As such, UREBA defines the term "real estate" more broadly than the ordinary and
customary definition of that term and, consequently, signals the legislature's intention to
apply UREBA's licensing requirements to a wider class of real estate-related
transactions. Currently, UREBA does not separately define the term "business
opportunities," id. § 61-2-2, and the term has no particular "peculiar and appropriate
meaning in law," id § 68-3-11. For example, there is no entry for the term "business
opportunity" in Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999), the Dictionary of Modern Legal
Usage (1990), or Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed.). Because the statute does not
define the term, and since it has no particular meaning in law, it must be construed
"according to . . . the approved usage of the language." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11.
This Court frequently consults standard dictionary definitions to assess the
"ordinary meaning" of an otherwise undefined term. See, e.g., Emergency Physicians
Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72,120, 586 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(consulting Webster's Third New International Dictionary for the definition of "facility");
State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ^ 19, 137 P.3d 726 (consulting Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary's definition of "marry"). An application of standard dictionary
definitions establishes that the term "business opportunities" means "good commercial
prospects" according to the ordinary English definition. The word "business" functions
as an adjective modifying the noun "opportunities." The word "opportunity" means "[a]
good position, chance, or prospect, as for advancement or success." Webster's
Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 1359 (2001). "Business"
is defined as "a person, partnership, or corporation engaged in commerce, manufacturing,
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or a service." Id. at 283; see also Black's Law Dictionary 192 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
"business" as "[a] commercial enterprise carried on for profit"). Therefore, a "business
opportunity" is, in ordinary parlance, "a good commercial prospect."
UREBA further modifies the term with the participial phrase "involving
real property." Because the term "real property" is not defined under UREBA, it must be
attributed its default definition. Thus, the phrase "business opportunities involving real
property" means "good commercial prospects involving land, tenements, hereditaments,
water rights, possessory rights, and claims." S!ee Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(k).
UPCM—a business that principally leases, develops, and sells real property
and whose asset of any significance whatsoever is thousands of acres of developable real
property—was in and of itself a good commercial prospect involving land. Thus,
locating a buyer for UPCM, regardless of what form the sale assumed, necessarily
involved the "procurement of prospects for" the sale of a "business opportunity]
involving real property." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(12).
III.

Alternatively, the Term "Business Opportunities Involving Eteal Property"
Should Be Construed According to Its Previous Statutory Definition
If this Court concludes the phrase "business opportunities involving real

property" is ambiguous, the legislative history of the key provisions of UREBA compels
this Court to apply a definition consonant with the previous statutory definition. See
Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990) ("When interpreting an
ambiguous statute, we first try to discover the underlying intent of the legislature, guided
by the meaning and purpose of the statute as a whole and the legislative history.").
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A.

The Legislative History of UREBA Indicates "Business Opportunity"
Includes Ongoing Businesses.
1.

The Legislative History of UREBA Prior to the 1985 Amendment.

The legislature first enacted laws regulating real estate brokers in 1921.
See An Act to Define Real Estate Brokers and Real Estate Salesmen, 1921 Utah Laws
304, 304-09, Ch. 110. By 1943, UREBA defined "real estate" to "include leaseholds and
other interests less than leaseholds." Utah Code Ann. § 82-2-2 (1943). In 1959, this
Court recognized that this definition "clearly indicate[d] the intention of the legislature
that a broad coverage be given to the term 'real estate5 for the purposes of this Act."
Chase v. Morgan, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1959).
Four years after this Court acknowledged the already broad scope of
UREBA and expansive definition of "real estate," the legislature further expanded the
definition of "real estate" to include "business opportunities." Real Estate Broker Act,
1963 Utah Laws 521, 522, Ch. 146, § 1. The legislature defined the term "business
opportunity" to "include an existing business, business and the good will attached thereto
or any one or combination thereof." Id
In 1983, the Utah Legislature created a new executive agency to administer
and enforce UREBA, moving responsibility for enforcing UREBA from the Securities
Commission (now the Division of Securities) to the newly created Division of Real
Estate (the "Division") within the Department of Business Regulation (now the
Department of Commerce). See Division of Real Estate Amendments—Sunset Review
Act, 1983 Utah Laws 1020, 1022, Ch. 257, § 5. The 1983 legislation extensively revised
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the material provisions of UREBA, including, among others, the procedures for licensing
brokers and the enforcement powers of the Division. See generally id.
The 1983 amendment also revised the definition of "real estate" to
"include[] leaseholds, business opportunities, and all timeshare interests (including but
not limited to fee simple, club membership, limited partnership, and beneficiary interests
in a timeshare trust)." Id. at 1021. In addition, the 1983 act clarified that the term
"business opportunity" meant "an existing business, a business and its good will, a
business franchise, or any combination of them." Id It is worth noting that this
definition is harmonious with the ordinary English definition of the term.
2.

In 1985, the Legislature Deleted the Definition for "Business
Opportunity" But Retained the Term in the Definition of "Real
Estate".

In 1985, the legislature again amended UREBA. Real Estate Amendments,
1985 Utah Laws 308, Ch. 162. The court of appeals concluded this legislation was the
watershed in which the legislature intended to eliminate existing businesses from the
definition of business opportunities. A careful analysis of the legislative history,
however, reveals the court of appeals based its conclusion on a material
misunderstanding of the 1985 legislation. According to the court of appeals, "[i]n 1985,
the Utah Legislature contracted the scope of the real estate broker's act [when]... it
deleted 'existing business, business and the good will attached thereto or any one of a
combination thereof from the expansive definition of 'business opportunity.'" Sachs,
2007 UT App 169, f 48; see also kL «|fl[ 39, 44 n.21. Rather than deleting certain phrases
from the definition of "business opportunities," as claimed by the court of appeals, the
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1985 legislation actually deleted the definition of "business opportunities" entirely. 1985
Utah Laws at 309. This is no small distinction: deleting portions of a definition indicates
something very different than deleting the whole definition.
While the 1985 legislation erased the definition of "business opportunities"
from UREBA, the definition of "real estate" continued to include that term: '"Real estate'
includes leaseholds, business opportunities, and all timeshare interests (including but not
limited to fee simple, club membership, limited partnership, and beneficiary interest in a
timeshare trust) involving real property." IdL The only amendment to the definition of
"real estate" contained in the 1985 legislation was the addition of the terminal qualifier
"involving real property." Id.
B.

The Legislative History and Stated Purpose for the 1985 Legislation Do
Not Support the Court of Appeal's Construction.
While the court of appeals "assume[d]" that the legislature intended to

exclude "existing businesses, businesses and their good will, [and] business franchises"
from the definition of "business opportunities," Sachs, 2007 UT App 1693 f 39, the
legislative history establishes this assumption is incorrect.
When the legislature first created the Real Estate Division in 1983, it
charged it with responsibility for the "administration and enforcement o f UREBA.
Division of Real Estate Amendments—Sunset Review Act, 1983 Utah Laws 1020, 1022,
Ch. 257, § 5. Apparently, the Division came to believe that certain statutory phrasing
needed fine-tuning. As the sponsor of the 1985 amending legislation, Representative
Richard J. Bradford, explained on the floor of the House of Representatives when he
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introduced the legislation (Second Substitute H.B. No. 284), "the initiative for it came
from the Department of Business Regulation, the Real Estate Division. It is an attempt to
clarify and clean up the existing statute regulating the real estate industry in Utah." Floor
Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 22, 1985) (House audograph discs nos. 8 & 9)
(statements of Rep. Bradford) (emphasis added) (a true and correct transcript of the
recording of the floor debate on Sec. Sub. H.B. No. 284 in the House of Representatives
is attached hereto as Exhibit F.) See also id. ("[T]he bill, as I've indicated before, is an
attempt to clarify and to clean up language in the statute.").
Senator Brent C. Overson, who spoke in favor of the bill in the Senate,
echoed Representative Bradford's statements and further explained the narrow purpose of
the legislation. Senator Overson stated:
This bill comes from the Real Estate Division. It has been
worked out with the real estate industry and it is basically to
amend the real estate statutes to clarify some things we did
back in 1983 with respect to the establishing the three classes
of licensing for brokers and also add some other definitions
so that the statute is clear.[6] It further defines the
Commission and Division role. It clarifies their working
relationship. It clarifies the license application language and
also it clarifies the issue of non-resident licenses. The current
statute is quite ambiguous and this cleans up that quite a bit.
It clarifies the issue of fiduciary duty and also establishes that
forms provided by the Real Estate Commission, Office of the
Attorney General, are those which are to be used by real
estate brokers.

The 1985 legislation added definitions for "concurrence," "director,"
"division," and "executive director." Real Estate Amendments, 1985 Utah Laws 308,
Ch. 162, § 2.
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Floor Debate, 46th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 27, 1985) (Senate recording disc no. 124)
(statements of Sen. Overson) (a true and correct transcript of the recording of the floor
debate on Sec. Sub. H.B. No. 284 in the Senate is attached hereto as Exhibit G.)
These statements from the sponsors of the 1985 legislation demonstrate that
the Court of Appeal's assumption about the intent of the legislature is erroneous. First,
the legislature did not intend the amendments to have any substantive effect. Rather, the
legislation was only intended to "clarify and to clean up language in the statute," and, in
particular, to clarify the changes made by the 1983 legislation. Utah v. Yates, 834 P.2d
599, 602 (Utah 1992) (recognizing that the presumption that amendments are "intended
to change existing legal rights and liabilities" only applies to "amendments] not
expressly characterized as a clarification").
Second, the legislative history nowhere suggests that the legislature
intended to substantively modify UREBA by removing the definition of "business
opportunities." Indeed, at no time during the floor debates in House of Representatives
or Senate was that particular change ever raised or addressed. Justice Nehring's
concurring opinion in Utah Public Employees Ass'n v. Utah, 2006 UT 9, f 93, 131 P.3d
208, speaks directly to the Court of Appeal's rather bold assumption:
Neither the sponsor of the [1985] amendment nor anyone who
rose in the legislature to speak to the merits of the amendment
indicated that it would bring about any modification of the
substance of the pre-amendment language. Yet, the [Court of
Appeal's] reading of the [1985] amendment requires a
dramatic interpretive shift to a meaning squarely at odds with
the legislative history.
For precisely this reason, the Court of Appeal's interpretation is erroneous.
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C.

The Court of Appeals Erred When It Determined That the 1985
Legislation Substantively Altered the Meaning of the Term "Business
Opportunities."
Based on the 1985 legislation (and, admittedly, without the benefit of the

floor debates), the court of appeals "assume[d]... that the legislature intended to
redefine the phrase 'business opportunities' to no longer mean existing businesses,
businesses and their good will, or business franchises." Sachs, 2007 UT App 169, % 39.
The court of appeal's "assumption" is flawed for at least two reasons: (1) the case law it
relied upon does not support the conclusion, and, more importantly, (2) the legislative
history negates it.
The court of appeals cited Sindt v. Retirement Board, 2007 UT 16, 570
Utah Adv. Rep. 71, for the proposition that courts must presume the legislature's removal
of a term from a statute is intended to have substantive effect. In Sindt, the plaintiff
argued that he was entitled to participate in the state's retirement system due to his
service as a constable. Id. ^ 6. During the period Mr. Sindt was a constable, the
legislature amended the retirement system statute several times. When Mr. Sindt began
his tenure, the statute specifically included the word "constable" in its definition of
"employee," but a later-enacted statute did not contain that term. IdL fl 7, 13. This Court
recognized that it could "not ignore the legislature's decision to remove the term," idL
Tf 13, and held that the "'omission of the [term] in the revised statute logically can mean
nothing but that the legislature's purpose deliberately was to remove' constables from
coverage in the state retirement system," id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1983)).
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While the inference Sindt draws from the legislature's removal of the term
"constable" was proper in that case, here, the legislature did not remove the term
"business opportunities" from the definition of real estate, it simply deleted the definition
of "business opportunity." Had the legislature intended to remove the term "business
opportunities" from the definition of "real estate," it would have done so in 1985—or
when it amended UREBA in 1987, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1997, 2003, and 2005. The
retention of the term "business opportunities" for the past twenty-two years, and through
seven statutory amendments, indicates the legislature intended to retain "business
opportunities" within the definition of "real estate." See Robert H. Hinckley, Inc. v. State
Tax Commission, 404 P.2d 662, 667-68 (Utah 1965) (noting that "it does not necessarily
follow from the fact that the 1937 amendment deleted the provision that the vendor had
the option of collecting from the vendee or absorbing the tax himself that the legislature
intended to prohibit or make it unlawful for a vendor to absorb or pay the tax himself);
State v. Alta Club, 232 P.2d 759, 761-62 (Utah 1951) ("In order to evaluate the
correctness of [the attorney general's] assertion, it is necessary first to determine the
meaning of the deleted phrase in its context in the unamended act. . . ."); Sulzen v.
Williams, 1999 UT App 76,ffi[20-23, 977 P.2d 497 (determining the intended effect of
an amendment deleting portions of a statute by examining (1) the legislature's "expressed
purpose" for the amendment, (2) the "provision's legislative history," and (3) the
"policies underlying the provision"); Cf Doe v. Utah Department of Public Safety, 782
P.2d 489 (Utah 1989) (holding that the deletion of "superfluous assurances of the effect
of expunction does not negate the fact that offenses are expunged").
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More importantly, as discussed in Part III.B, supra, the history of the 1985
legislation disproves the court of appeal's "assumption" about the legislature's intent.
Given that the expressed purpose of the legislation was merely intended to "clarify and to
clean up language" in the statute, and, in particular, "to clarify some things [the
legislature] did back in 1983," the court of appeals erred in concluding the legislature
intended to exclude existing businesses from the definition of "business opportunity."
IV.

The Judiciary Should Defer to the Real Estate Commission's Reasonable
Interpretation of the Term "Business Opportunities".
The Real Estate Commission, pursuant to the rulemaking "authority granted

by Section 61-2-5.5," defined "business opportunity" to mean "[t]he sale, lease, or
exchange of any business which includes an interest in real estate." Utah Admin. Code
rr. 162-1-1(1.1), 162-1-2(1.2.4) (2007). This construction of the term "business
opportunity" is consistent with the prior statutory definition as well as the ordinary
English definition. Whether or not this is the best possible interpretation, it is well within
"the tolerable limits of reason." Williams, 754 P.2d at 50.
An administrative agency's interpretation of statutory language is entitled
to deference "on the basis of [either] an explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained
in the governing statute." Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah
1991). Here, the legislature explicitly granted the Real Estate Commission (the
"Commission") rulemaking authority to administer UREBA, or, alternatively, implicitly
granted the Commission authority to define the term "business opportunity" by removing
the definition of the term from the statute.
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When the legislature created the Real Estate Division, it simultaneously
created the Commission to administer and determine policy for the Division. See
Division of Real Estate Amendments—Sunset Review Act, 1983 Utah Laws 1020, 102223, Ch. 257, § 6 ("The commission shall... promulgate rules relating to the licensing
and conduct of real estate principal brokers, brokers, and salesman .. .."). The
Commission is authorized, indeed mandated, to "make rules for the administration of th[e
Division of Real Estate ] chapter that are not inconsistent with th[e] chapter,
including[,]... licensing of... principal brokers." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-5.5 (2007).7
Section 61-2-5.5 constitutes an "explicit.. . grant of discretion contained in the
governing statute." Morton Inf I Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991);
see also Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) (An agency's
"interpretation of the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to
administer . . . [is] only set aside if... imposed arbitrarily or capriciously or [if it is]
beyond the tolerable limits of reason.").
Alternatively, the authority granted the Commission by Section 61-2-5.5,
coupled with the removal of the definition for "business opportunity," implicitly granted
the Commission discretion to enact rules interpreting that term. Although Appellants
believe that the meaning of the term "business opportunity" is discernible, either from its
plain language or by applying traditional rules of statutory construction, if this Court
n

Although minor stylistic changes have been made, this provision was
substantively identical in 2001 and 2002, the years in which Sachs purportedly located a
buyer for UPCM.
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disagrees, then the legislature implicitly granted the Commission discretion to define the
term. As Morton International explained, when legislative intent cannot be "derived
through traditional methods of statutory construction,... it is appropriate to conclude
that the legislature has delegated authority to the agency to decide the issue." 814 P.2d at
589. Pursuant to this delegation of authority, the Commission has promulgated a
reasonable definition for the term "business opportunity."
Under the Commission's definition of "business opportunity," which is
entitled to deference, the sale of UPCM was a business opportunity since it was
indisputably a "sale . . . of a[] business which includes an interest in real estate." (R. at 23, 111445, 1210, 1257.)
V.

Appellants' Definition of the Term "Business Opportunity" Is Consistent
with Comparable Statutes from Other States.
Although the standard tools of statutory construction and the plain meaning

ascribed by the Commission disambiguate the term "business opportunity," statutes and
judicial constructions from other states corroborate the meaning derived from these
sources.
A survey of case law and statutes from other jurisdictions confirms that the
term "business opportunities" includes the sale of an existing business Ihrough the
transfer of its stock. See, e.g., Coonev v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81, 84-88 (3d Cir. 1991)
(finding New Jersey's real estate broker statute applied to sale of stock); Shochet Secur.,
Inc. v. First Union Corp., 663 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that sale of
business through stock purchase was a sale of a business opportunity under Florida's

DMWEST #6563115 v1

28

licensing law, but holding statute unconstitutional due to procedural defects (it was
subsequently re-enacted)); Broughall v. Black Forest Dev. Co., 593 P.2d 314, 316 (Colo.
1978) ("[T]he statute obviously was [intended] to align Colorado with the majority New
Jersey rule which requires a finder . . . to have a real estate broker's license if the sale of
the business includes a transfer of any interest in real estate."); Lieff v. Medco Prof 1
Servs. Corp., 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (same); Everett v. Goodloe, 602
S.E.2d 284, 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (The "sale of all of the stock of the corporation was
in legal effect a sale of all of its assets, and the mere fact that the parties found it more
convenient to transfer all of the stock rather than to make a conveyance of its assets does
not change the substance of the transaction." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Burks
v. Elevation Outdoor Adver., LLC, 220 S. W.3d 478 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
alleged oral agreement to pay commission for arranging for sale of business whose most
important asset was leaseholds required license); Springer v. Rosauer, 641 P.2d 1216,
1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) ("A person authorized to find a buyer for all of the stock of a
corporation for compensation has been held to be a real estate business opportunity
broker within the meaning of this statute."); Schmitt v. Coad, 604 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1979) ("Although a sale of corporate stock is . . . a sale of securities, it does not
o

follow that it may not also constitute a sale of a ' . . . business opportunity . . ..'").

8

See also, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 54-2004 ("'Business opportunity' means and
includes an established business, good will of an established business, or any interest
therein, or any one (1) or combination thereof, where a sale or transfer of an interest in
land including, but not limited to, an assignment of a lease, is involved in the
transaction."); Cf. Shortt v. Knob City Inv. Co., 292 S.E.2d 737, 741 (N.C. Ct. App.
(continued...)
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The Court of Appeal's reliance on Gruber v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d
1366 (3d Cir. 1990), is misplaced. Although the court found that Pennsylvania's real
estate broker's act did not apply to a sale of a business completed through a stock
transfer, Pennsylvania's licensing act does not define "real estate" to include "business
opportunities," as does UREBA. See 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 455.201 (1990) (defining "real
estate," in pertinent part, as "[a]ny interest or estate in land, whether corporeal,
incorporeal, freehold or nonfreehold, whether the land is situated in this Commonwealth
or elsewhere including leasehold interests and time share and similarly designated
interests").9

(...continued)

1982) (The "sale of 100 percent of the stock in defendant constituted a sale by the
defendant corporation of the property in question.").
Like UREBA, New Hampshire's real estate broker licensing statute defines "real estate"
to include "business opportunities which involve any interest in real estate." N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 331-A:2. Like UREBA, New Hampshire's statute does not provide a
definition for "business opportunities." See icl In Blackthorne Group, Inc. v. Pines of
Newmarket, Inc., 848 A.2d 725, 731 (N.H. 2004), the New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that because "the sale of the defendant's business indisputably involved real estate,
[New Hampshire's real estate broker licensing] Act applied to the sale."
9

All but one of cases that the Court of Appeals cited on this issue, see Sachs,
2007 UT App 169, f 43 n.19, are similarly inapposite. See Abramson v. Gulf Coast
Jewelry & Specialty Co., 445 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1971) (Alabama's statute did not apply
to business opportunities, see Ala. Code § 34-27-1 to -11 (1975)); Cambridge Co. v. Ariz.
Lawn Sprinklers, Inc., 801 P.2d 504, 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (Arizona's statute did not
define real estate to include business opportunities, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2101(32) (1990)
("'Real estate' includes leasehold-interests and any estates in land .. . regardless of
whether located in this state."); additionally, the court found the "completed
transaction . . . expressly exclude[d] transfer of the leasehold interest," the only real estate
involved.); Frier v. Terry, 323 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1959) (Arkansas' real estate broker
statute did not apply to transactions involving "business opportunities," see Ark. Code
Ann. §§ 17-35-101, 102 (1987) (renumbered and re-codified from Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71(continued...)
DMWEST #6563115 v1

30

VI.

The Court of Appeal's Definition of "Business Opportunities" Renders the
Term Inoperative and Superfluous or Leads to Absurd Results.
The Court of Appeal's construction of the phrase "business opportunities55

leaves the term without any effect or consequence, in violation of the rule requiring
courts to "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or
inoperative.55 Hall v. Dep 5 tof Corr., 2001 UT 34, ^ 15, 24 P.3d 958.
While the Court of Appeal's premise—that the terms "business
opportunity55 and "ongoing business55 are not synonymous—is correct, the Court of
Appeal's conclusion—that the term "business opportunity55 does not include "existing
businesses,55 Sachs, 2007 UT App 169, f 39—does not follow from its premise. The term
"business opportunity55 is expansive and covers far more than mere existing businesses,
including prospective businesses; subsidiaries, divisions, or units of existing businesses;
business franchises; and business goodwill.10

(...continued)

1302 (1947)).); Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Group, Inc., 528 N.E.2d 1176 (Mass.
1988) (Massachusetts5 statute did not apply to "business opportunities55 and defined "real
estate55, in pertinent part, as "any and every estate or interest in land and the
improvements thereon,55 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 87PP (1987).); Moody v. Hurricane
Creek Lumber Co., 625 P.2d 1306, 1307-11 (Or. 1981) (The real estate broker statute did
not apply to "business opportunities55 and Oregon had a completely separate business
broker licensing statute, which contained an exception for isolated transactions;
additionally, the transaction did not involve the sale of stock, but an asset purchase.);
Evans v. Prufrock Rests., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (discussed infra).
10

The Court of Appeal's restrictive view of the term "business opportunities55 is
evident from its opinion: "Had the legislature defined real estate to include businesses
involving real property, we would agree that UREBA is applicable. The plain language
of the statute, however, includes only business opportunities.55 (Sachs, 2007 UT App
169,13 8 (emphasis added).)
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The Court of Appeal's construction is simply untenable. The ordinary
English definition of "business opportunity"—"a good commercial prospect"—
encompasses ongoing businesses as well as numerous other business-related transactions
comprising something less than an existing business.
If the term "business opportunity" does not include existing businesses,
business goodwill, or business franchises, the term can rationally have no substantive
meaning at all. Saying that an apple is not a "rounded red, yellow, or green edible fruit"
is to negate the term entirely; concluding that a term specifically excludes its ordinary
meaning leaves only an empty shell. However, since the legislature is presumed to have
"used each word [in a statute] advisedly," courts are required to "give effect to each
term." Utah State Bar, 905 P.2d at 871.
VII.

The Court of Appeals Erred by Determining That the Sale Did Not Fall
Under the Licensing Statute Because of the Form of the Transaction,
The lynchpin in the Court of Appeal's analysis is the observation that "the

business opportunity at issue is the purchase of all of UPCM's capital stock" and that
corporate shares "constitute a property interest quite distinct from the capital or tangible
assets of the corporation." Sachs, 2007 UT App 169,fflf40, 42.
While the Court of Appeals is correct about the traditional nature of
corporate equity interests, it relies heavily on conventional notions of real estate in its
reasoning. Although the legislature defined "real estate" under UREB A to include nonstandard forms, such as business opportunities, the Court of Appeals held that a sale of
securities can never be a sale of real estate. As the Washington Court of Appeals aptly
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stated, "[although a sale of corporate stock is . . . a sale of securities, it does not follow
that it may not also constitute a sale of a ' . . . business opportunity . . . . ' " Schmitt v.
Coad, 604 P.2d 507, 509 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). It is the legislature's prerogative to
define the sale of stock in a corporation holding real property assets as a sale of a
business opportunity involving real property and, therefore, a sale of real estate.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal's reliance on the form of the transaction
rests on an anachronism. The only evidence in the record on this issue establishes that
the decision to consummate the transaction as a sale of stock, rather than, for example, as
an asset purchase, was not made until well after Sachs allegedly found a buyer for UPCM
and concluded his involvement. (R. at 7, 14, 1214-15, 1273, 1279, 1977,2021-22.) At
the time Sachs allegedly found Jackson, no one—including Sachs—knew what form the
transaction would ultimately assume. That Sachs knew the real value of the company
lied in its vast portfolio of developable real property is amply demonstrated by the fact
that the prospective purchasers he contacted were all in the real estate development
industry. (R. at 5, 1116, 1211.)
VIIL The Court of Appeal's Interpretation of UREBA Renders the Statute
Constitutionally Suspect.
Violating UREBA carries a criminal penalty: "[ajny individual violating
this chapter .. . is . . . guilty of a class A misdemeanor" and is subject to "imprisonment
[up to] six months." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-17. This Court has consistently followed
the "fundamental rule of statutory construction that 'if a legislative act is susceptible of
two constructions, one conformable to the constitutional provision on the subject and the
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other not, [it] will adopt the one that is conformable, and reject the one that is not.5"
Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, f 42, 163 P.3d 623 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v.
Holman, 202 P. 1096, 1098 (Utah 1921)). The Court of Appeal's interpretation of
UREBA, however, introduces significant equal protection and due process concerns,
whereas Appellants' interpretation avoids such problems.
When the after-the-fact discretionary "action of a third party" is a "factor
which determines whether guilt attaches" under a criminal statute, "[s]uch a discretion is
at odds with constitutional due process and equal protection of the laws." Colorado v.
Vinnola, 494 P.2d 826, 831 (Colo. 1972); accord Tolbert v. Alabama, 321 So. 2d 227,
23 1 (Ala. 1975). Yet, the Court of Appeal's construction of UREBA permits just this
situation because a person may become subject to UREBA, and its criminal penalties, as
a consequence of decisions of third parties made after that person has completed his
services. Under the Court of Appeal's construction, an unlicensed person who merely
introduces an owner of a business with real property assets to a willing buyer, but plays
no role in determining how the transaction is ultimately structured,

may or may not

become subject to UREBA's criminal penalties depending on whether the buyer and
seller consummate the deal as an asset purchase or as a stock purchase.

11

See Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848, 850
(Utah 1978) (holding that UREBA applies to a person who "'bringfs] the [buyer and
seller] together in an amicable frame of mind'" even if that person has no role in
"'working out the terms of their agreement.'" (quoting Corson v. Keane, 72 A.2d 314,
316 (N.J. 1950)).
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In contrast, Appellants' interpretation erects a bright-line rule that avoids
such due process concerns: under Appellants' interpretation, finders are on notice that
they need a real estate license if the business opportunity involves real property,
regardless of how the transaction is ultimately consummated.
IX.

The Court of Appeal's Interpretation Is Contrary to the Policy of UREBA
and Invites Abuse by Elevating Form Above Substance.
The Court of Appeal's interpretation also undermines the "real purpose of

the real estate broker's legislation," which is "the protection of the public from dishonest
or unscrupulous persons whose business is dealing in transactions whose objects are the
consummation of real estate deals." Seal v. Powell 345 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah 1959). The
Court of Appeal's interpretation creates a loophole that can be exploited by precisely the
same unscrupulous persons the legislation was designed to guard against. Should the
Court of Appeal's interpretation stand, it would permit unlicensed brokers to avoid the
statute by structuring real estate transactions to take advantage of the loophole, using the
Court of Appeal's opinion as a blueprint for avoiding UREBA.
For example, an unscrupulous and unlicensed broker might suggest to a
seller of residential property that, in his experience, it is easier to sell in a weak housing
market by structuring the deal as a transfer of interests in a limited liability company.
The broker then forms a limited liability company for the trusting seller and brokers a
sale of the residential property as a transfer of all of the membership interests in the
limited liability company. By such an easy artifice, this broker could, under the Court of
Appeal's construction, avoid UREBA's sanctions and accomplish, in substance, exactly
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what UREBA prohibits. Because "[jurisprudential pragmatism prevents the exaltation
of legalities to a sacrosanct status in disregard of realities," this Court should reject an
approach that permits, indeed invites, such a result. Kingston Dev. Co,, v. Kenerlv, 208
S.E.2d 118, 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
X.

The Court of Appeals Erred By Concluding That Utah's Statute of Frauds
Does Not Apply to the Alleged Agreement Because the Transaction Was
Effected as a Transfer of Stock.

A.

The Statute of Frauds Applies to Sachs' Alleged Oral Agreement.
Under Utah's Statute of Frauds, "every agreement authorizing or employing an

agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation" is "void" unless it is "in
writing" and "signed by the party to be charged with the agreement." Utah Code Ann.
§ 25-5-4(1). This provision applies with equal force to purported "finder's agreements."
Machan Hampshire Props., Inc. v. W. Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (The statute of frauds "applies broadly to agreements requiring
compensation for brokering real estate, including finder's agreements, and not just to
contracts employing brokers to purchase or sell real estate for compensation."); C.J.
Realty. Inc. v. WiUev, 758 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (The statute of frauds "applies
to the commission agreements of real estate brokers generally and not just to contracts
employing brokers to 'purchase or sell real estate for compensation.'").
To satisfy the statute of frauds, a finder's fee agreement "must contain all the
essential terms and provisions of the contract to which the parties have agreed." Machan,
779 P.2d at 234. At a minimum, the writing must identify "the finder, the finder's
clients, the property owner who will owe a commission to the finder if a transaction is
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closed . . . , and the commission rate." C.J. Realty, Inc., 758 P.2d at 928. Further, the
"writings must so clearly evidence the fact that a contract was made, and what its terms
are, 'that there is no serious possibility that the assertion of the contract is false.'"
Machan, 779 P.2d at 235 (quoting 2A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 512
at 547 (1950)).
It is undisputed that no writing satisfying each of the requirements of the statute of
frauds exists. Rather, Sachs bases his right to a commission on an alleged unwritten
agreement, an agreement Appellants vehemently deny.
B.

The Statute of Frauds Must Be Construed in Harmony with UREBA.
The section of the statute of frauds addressing "agreements] authorizing or

employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation," Utah
Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1), relates to the same subject matter as the licensing provisions of
UREBA, which apply to a broker "employed by . .. the owner of real estate or by a
prospective purchaser" to "sell[] or . . . buy[] . . . real estate . .. with the expectation of
receiving valuable consideration," id. § 61-2-2(12). "Statutes are considered to be in pari
materia and thus must be construed together when they relate to the same person or thing,
to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object." Utah County
v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985).
Because the relevant portions of the statute of frauds and UREBA relate to the
same class of persons (real estate brokers) and things (compensation for selling real
estate), and have the same basic purpose (the prevention of fraud by unscrupulous
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brokers), "those statutes should be construed to be in pari materia [and] construed with
reference to one another and harmonized if possible." Id. (footnotes omitted). Because
the statute of frauds does not define "real estate," it is appropriate to refer to the
definition of "real estate" contained in UREBA, thereby harmonizing the statute of frauds
with UREBA.
As such, because the unwritten agreement Appellee seeks to enforce purportedly
employed him to sell real estate—particularly, a business opportunity involving real
property—for compensation, the agreement is void.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request that the Court reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals. In addition, Appellants respectfully request that the
Court remand this case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to enter an order
affirming the Order and Judgment entered by the district court.

12

Compare Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976) (The broker
provision of the statute of frauds is for the "purpose of protecting the owners of land from
fraudulent and fictitious claims for commissions.") with Seal v. Powell 345 P.2d 432,
433 (Utah 1959) (UREBA's purpose is "the protection of the public from dishonest or
unscrupulous persons whose business is dealing in transactions whose objects are the
consummation of real estate deals.").
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(4) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy
is accepted in this state when acceptance:
(a) is communicated to the offeror in this state; and
(b) has not previously been communicated to the offeror, orally or in writing, outside this state, and acceptance is communicated to the offeror in this state,
whether or not either party is then present in this state,
when the offeree directs it to the offeror in this state
reasonably believing the offeror to be in this state and it is
received at the place to which it is directed or at any post
office in this state in the case of a mailed acceptance.
(5) An offer to sell or to buy is not made in this state when:
(a) the publisher circulates or there is circulated on his
behalf in this state any bona fide newspaper or other
publication of general, regular, and paid circulation which
is not published in this state, or which is published in this
state but has had more than Vz of its circulation outside
this state during the past 12 months; or
(b) a radio or television program originating outside
this state is received in this state.
(6) Section 61-1-2 and Subsection 61-1-3(3), as well as
Section 61-1-17 so far as investment advisers are concerned,
apply when any act instrumental in effecting prohibited
conduct is done in this state, whether or not either party is
then present in this state.
(7) (a) Every application for registration under this chapter and every issuer which proposes to offer a security in
this state through any person acting on an agency basis in
the common-law sense shall file with the division, in such
form as it prescribes by rule, an irrevocable consent
appointing the division or the director to be his attorney
to receive service of any lawful process in any noncriminal
suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor,
executfor, or administrator which arises under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder after the consent has
been filed, with the same force and validity as if served
personally on the person filing the consent.
(b) A person who has filed such a consent in connection
with a previous registration or notice filing need not file
another.
(c) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the
process in the office of the division, but it is not effective
unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit,
action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the
service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the
defendant or respondent at his last address on file with
the division, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance
with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the
return day of the process, if any, or within such further
time as the court allows.
(8) (a) When any person, including any nonresident of this
state, engages in conduct prohibited or made actionable
by this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, and he has
not filed a consent to service of process under Subsection
(7) and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be
obtained in this state, that conduct shall be considered
equivalent to his appointment of the division or the
director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful
process in any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding
against him or his successor executor or administrator
which grows out of that conduct and which is brought
under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, with
the same force and validity as if served on him personally.
(b) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the
process in the office of the division, but it is not effective
unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in a suit,
action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the
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takes other steps which sire reasonably calculated to give
actual notice, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance
with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the
return day of the process, if any, or within such further
time as the court allows.
(9) When process is served under this section, the court, or
the director shall order such continuance as may be necessary
to afford the defendant or respondent reasonable opportunity
to defend.
,
1997
61-1-27. Construction of chapter.
This chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact
it and to coordinate the inteipretation and administration of
this chapter with the related federal regulation.
>
1983
61-1-28. Citation of chapter.
This chapter may be cited as the Utah Uniform Securities
Act.

1983

61-1-29. Savings clause.
If any provision of this chapter or its application to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not
affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can
be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
1983

61-1-30. Prior law repealed — Savings clause.
(1) The Securities Act, Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended! by Chapter 129, Laws of Utah
1957, is hereby repealed except as saved in this section.
(2) Prior law exclusively governs all suits, actions, prosecutions, or proceedings which are pending or may be initiated on
the basis of facts or circumstances occurring before <the effective date of this chapter, except that no civil suit or action may
be maintained to enforce any liability under prior law unless
brought within any period of limitation which applied when
$ie cause of action accrued and in any event within two years
after the effective date of this chapter.
(3) All effective registrations under prior law, all administrative orders relating to such registrations, and all conditions
imposed upon such registrations remain in effect so long as
they would have remained in effect if this chapter had not
been passed. They are considered to have been filed, entered,
or imposed under this chapter, but are governed by prior law.
(4) Prior law applies* in respect of any offer or sale made
within one year after the effective date of this chapter pursuant to an offering begun in good faith before its effective date
on the basis of an exemption available under prior law.
(5) Judicial review of all a<lministrative orders as to which
review proceedings'have not been instituted by the effective
date of this chapter are governed by Section 61-1-23, except
that no review proceeding may be instituted unless the
petition is filed within any period of limitation which applied
to a review proceeding when the order was entered and in any
event within 60 days after the effective date of this chapter.
1983

CHAPTER 2
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
Section
61-2-1.
61-2-2.
61-2-3.
61-2-4.
61-2-5.

License required.
Definitions.
Exempt persons and transactions.
One act for compensation qualifies person as
broker or sales agent.
Division of Real Estate created — Functions —
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ection
1-2-5.5.

Real Estate Commission created — Functions
— Appointment — Qualification and terms
of members — Expenses — Meetings.
Licensing procedures and requirements.
1-2-6.
Form of license — Display of license.
1-2-7.
Change of information — Failure to notify —
1-2-7.1.
Notification to an applicant, licensee, or certificate holder.
Reporting requirements.
11-2-7.2.
Discharge of associate broker or sales agent by
Jl-2-8.
principal broker — Notice.
Examination and license fees — Background
51-2-9.
check — Renewal of licenses — Education
requirements — Activation of inactive licenses — Recertification — Licenses of firm,
partnership, or association — Miscellaneous
fees.
Restriction on commissions — Affiliation with
31-2-10.
more than one broker — Specialized licenses
— Designation of agents or brokers.
Investigations — Subpoena power of division
51-2-11.
— Grounds for disciplinary action.
Investigations related to an undivided frac61-2-11.5.
tionalized long-term estate.
Disciplinary action — Judicial review.
61-2-12.
Grounds for revocation of principal broker's
61-2-13.
license —Automatic inactivation of affiliated
associate brokers' and sales' agents licenses.
Court-ordered discipline.
61-2-13.5.
List of licensees to be available.
61-2-14.
61-2-15, 61 •2-16. Repealed.
Penalty for violation of chapter.
61-2-17.
Actions for recovery of compensation re61-2-18.
stricted.
Repealed.
61-2-19.
Rights and privileges of real estate licensees.
61-2-20.
Remedies and action for violations.
61-2-21.
Separability.
61-2-22.
Repealed.
61-2-23.
Mishandling of trust funds.
61-2-24.
Sales agents — Affiliated with broker as inde61-2-25.
pendent contractors or employees — Presumption.
61-2-26.
Rulemaking required for offer or sale of an
undivided fractionalized long-term estate —
Disclosures — Management agreement.
61-2-27.
Exclusive brokerage agreement.
61-2-1. License required.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business,
act in the capacity of, advertise, or assume to act as a principal
real estate broker, associate real estate broker, or a real estate
sales agent within this state without a license obtained under
this chapter.
(2) It is unlawful for any person outside the state to engage
in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or assume to
act as a principal real estate broker, associate real estate
broker, or a real estate sales agent with respect to real estate
located within the state without a license obtained under this
chapter.
1996
61-2-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate bro-
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(12) for valuable consideration, who has qualified under
this chapter as a principal real estate broker.
(2) "Branch office" means a principal broker's real estate brokerage office other than the principal broker's
main office.
(3) "Commission" means the Real Estate Commission
established under this chapter.
(4) "Concurrence" means the entities given a concurring role must jointly agree for action to be taken.
(5) "Condominium" or "condominium unit" is as defined
in Section 57-8-3.
(6) "Condominium homeowners' association" means all
of the condominium unit owners acting as a group in
accordance with declarations and bylaws.
(7) (a) "Condominium hotel" means one or more condominium units that are operated as a hotel.
(b) "Condominium hotel" does not mean a hotel
consisting of condominium units, all of which are
owned by a single entity.
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Real
Estate.
(9) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate.
(10) "Executive director" means the director of the
Department of Commerce.
(11) "Main office" means the address which a principal
broker designates with the division as the principal broker's primary brokerage office.
(12) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal broker" means any person: •
(a) (i) who sells or lists for sale, buys, exchanges,
or auctions real estate, options on real estate, or
improvements on real estate with the expectation of receiving valuable consideration; or
(ii) who advertises, offers, attempts, or otherwise holds himself out to be engaged in the
business described in Subsection (12)(a)(i);
(b) employed by or on behalf of the owner of real
estate or by a prospective purchaser of real estate
who performs any of the acts described in Subsection
(12)(a), whether the person's compensation is at a
stated salary, a commission basis, upon a salary and
commission basis, or otherwise;
(c) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable
consideration, manages property owned by another
person or who advertises or otherwise holds himself
out to be engaged in property management;
(d) who, with the expectation of receiving valuable
consideration, assists or directs in the procurement of
prospects for or the negotiation of the transactions
listed in Subsections (12)(a) and (c); and
(e) except for mortgage lenders, title insurance
agents, and their employees, who assists or directs in
the closing of any real estate transaction with the
expectation of receiving valuable consideration.
(13) (a) "Property management" means engaging in,
with the expectation of receiving valuable consideration, the management of property owned by another
person or advertising or otherwise claiming to be
engaged in property management by:
(i) advertising for, arranging, negotiating, offering, or otherwise attempting or participating
in a transaction calculated to secure the rental or
leasing of real estate;
(ii) collecting, agreeing, offering, or otherwise
attempting to collect rent for the real estate and
accounting for and disbursing the money col-
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(b) "Property management" does not include:
(i) hotel or motel management;
(ii) rental of tourist accommodations, including hotels, motels, tourist homes, condominiums,
condominium hotels, mobile home park accommodations, campgrounds, or similar public accommodations for any period of less than 30
consecutive days, and the management activities
associated with these rentals; or
(iii) the leasing or management of surface or
subsurface minerals or oil and gas interests, if
the leasing or management is separate from a
sale or lease of the surface estate.
(14) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business
opportunities involving real property.
(15) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" mean '
any person affiliated with a licensed principal real estate
broker, either as an independent contractor or an employee as provided in Section 61-2-25, to perform for
valuable consideration any act set out in Subsection (12).
(16) (a) "Regular salaried employee" means an individual who performs a service for wages or other remuneration, whose employer withholds federal employment taxes under a contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied.
(b) "Regular salaried employee" does not include a
person who performs services on a project-by-project
basis or on a commission basis.
(17) "Reinstatement^ means restoring a license that
has expired or has been suspended.
(18) "Reissuance" means the process by which a licensee may obtain a license following revocation of the
license.
(19) "Renewal" means extending a license for an additional licensing period on or before the date the license
l
expires.
(20) (a) "Undivided fractionalized long-term estate"
means an ownership interest in real property by two
or more persons that is a:
(i) tenancy in common; or
(ii) any other legal form of undivided estate m
real property including:
(A) a fee estate;
(B) a life estate; or
(C) other long-term estate.
(b) '"Undivided fractionalized long-term estate"
does not include a joint tenancy.
2005

-2-3. Exempt persons and transactions.
1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a license
under this chapter is not required for:
(i) any person who as owner or lessor performs the
acts described in Subsection 61-2-2(12) with reference to property owned or leased by that person;
(ii) a regular salaried employee of the owner or
lessor of real estate who, with reference to nonresidential real estate owned or leased by the employer,
performs the acts enumerated in Subsections 61-22(12)(a) and (b);
(iii) a regular salaried employee of the owner of
real estate who performs property management services with reference to real estate owned by the
employer, except that the employee may only manage
property for one employer;
(iv) a person who performs property management
services for the apartments" at which that person
resides in exchange for free or reduced rent on that
person's apartment;
*
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subject to the declaration of condominium that established the homeowners' association, except that the
employee may only manage property for one condominium homeowners' association; and
(vi) a regular salaried employee of a licensed property management company who performs support
services, as'prescribed by rule, for the property management company,
(b) Subsection (l)(a) does not exempt from licensing:
(i) employees engaged in the, sale of properties
regulated under Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform
Land Sales Practices Act and Title 57, Chapter 19,
Timeshare and Camp Resort Act;
(ii) employees engaged in the sale of cooperative
interests regulated under Title 57, Chapter 23, Real
Estate Cooperative Marketing Act; or x
(iii) any person whose interest as an owner or
lessor was obtained by him or transferred to him for
the purpose of evading the application of this chapter,
and not for any other legitimate business reason.
(2) A license under this chapter is not required for:
(a) isolated transactions by persons holding a duly
executed power of attorney from the owner;
(b) services rendered by an attorney at law in performing his duties as an attorney at law;
(c) a receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, administrator^
executor, or any person acting under order of any court;
(d) a trustee or its employees under a deed of trust or a
will; or
(e) any public utility, its officers, or, regular salaried^
employees, unless performance of any of the acts set out
in Subsection 61-2-2(12) is in connection with the sale,
purchase, lease, or other disposition of real estate or
investment in real estate unrelated to the principal business activity of that public utility.
(3) (a) Except as provided r in Subsection (3)(b), a license
under this chapter is not required for any person registered to act as a broker-dealer, agent, or investment
advisor under the Utah and federal securities laws in the
sale or the offer for sale of real estate if:
(i) the real estate is a necessary element of a
"security" as that term is defined by the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securitie s Exchange Act of 1934; and
(ii) the security is registered for sale pursuant to
the Securities Act of 1933 or by Title 61, Chapter 1,
Utah Uniform Securities Act.
(b) The exemption in Subsection (3)(a) does not apply to
exempt or resale transactions.
'
1996
61-2-4. One act for compensation qualifies person as
1
broker or sales agent.
Except as provided in Section 61-2-3, one act, for valuable
consideration, of buying, selling, leasing, managing, or exchanging real estate for another, or of offering for another to
buy, sell, lease, manage, or exchange real estate, requires the
person performing, offering, or attempting to perform the act
to be Kcensed as a principal real estate broker, an associate
real estate broker, or a real estate sales agent as set forth in
this chapter.
1996
61-2-5. Division of Real Estate created — Functions —
Director appointed — Functions.
* (1) There is created within the Department of Commerce a
Division of Real Estate. It is responsible for the administration and enforcement of:
(a) this chapter;
(b) Title 57, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Land Sales
Practices Act:
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(d) Title 57, Chapter 23, Real Estate Cooperative Marketing Act;
(e) Chapter 2a, Real Estate Education, Research, and
Recovery Fund;
(f) Chapter 2b, Real Estate Appraiser Licensing and
Certification Act; and
(g) Chapter 2c, Utah Residential Mortgage Practices
Act.
(2) The division is under the direction and control of a
director appointed by the executive director of the department
with the approval of the governor. The director holds the office
of director at the pleasure of the governor.
(3) The director, with the approval of the executive director,
may employ personnel necessary to discharge the duties of the
division at salaries to b fixed by the director according to
standards established by the Department of Administrative
Services.
(4) On or before October 1 of each year, the director shall, in
conjunction with the department, report to the governor and
the Legislature concerning the division's work for the preceding fiscal year ending June 30.
(5) The director, in conjunction with the executive director,
shall prepare and submit to t h e governor and t h e Legislature
a budget for the fiscal year next following the convening of t h e
Legislature.
2000

61-2-5.1. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings.
The Division of Real E s t a t e shall comply with t h e procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its adjudicative proceedings.
1997

61-2-5.5. Real Estate Commission created — Functions
— Appointment — Qualification and terms of
members — Expenses — Meetings.
(1) There is created within the division a Real Estate
Commission. The commission shall:
(a) make rules for the administration of this chapter
that are not inconsistent with this chapter, including:
(i) licensing of:
(A) principal brokers;
(B) associate brokers;
(C) sales agents;
(D) real estate companies; and
(E) branch offices;
(ii) prelicensing and postlicensing education curricula;
(iii) examination procedures;
(iv) the certification and conduct of:
(A) real estate schools;
(B) course providers; and
(C) instructors;
(v) proper handling of funds received by real estate
licensees;
(vi) brokerage office procedures and recordkeeping
requirements;
(vii) property management;
(viii) standards of conduct for real estate licensees;
and
(ix) rules made under Section 61-2-26 regarding an
undivided fractionalized long-term estate;
(b) establish, with the concurrence of the division, all
fees as provided in this chapter and Title 61, Chapter 2a,
Real Estate Recovery Fund Act;
(c) conduct all administrative hearings not delegated
by the commission to an administrative law judge or the
division relating to the:
(i) licensing of any applicant;
(ii) conduct of any licensee; or
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(d) with the concurrence of the director, impose sanctions against licensees and certificate holders as provided
in Section 61-2-11;
(e) advise the director on the administration and enforcement of any matters affecting the division and the
real estate sales and property management industries;
(f) advise the director on matters affecting the division
budget;
(g) advise and assist the director in conducting real
estate seminars; and
(h) perform other duties as provided by:
(i) this chapter; and
(ii) Title 61, Chapter 2a, Real Estate Recovery
Fund Act.
(2) (a) The commission shall be comprised of five members
appointed by the governor and approved by the Senate.
(b) Four of the commission members shall:
(i) have at least five years' experience in the real
estate business; and
(ii) hold an active principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent license.
(c) One commission member shall be a member of the
general public.
(d) No more than one commission member may be
appointed from any given county in the state.
(3) (a) Except as required by Subsection (3)(b), as terms of
current commission members expire, the governor shall
appoint each new member or reappointed member to a
four-year term ending June 30.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection
(3)(a), the governor shall, at the time of appointment or
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that
the terms of commission members are staggered so that
approximately half of the commission is appointed every
two years.
(c) Upon the expiration of the term of a member of the
commission, the member of the commission shall continue
to hold office until a successor is appointed and qualified.
(d) A commission member may not serve more than one
consecutive term.
(e) Members of the commission shall annually select
one member to serve as chair.
(4) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired
term.
(5) (a) A member shall receive no compensation or benefits
for the member's services, but may receive per diem and
expenses incurred in the performance of the member's
official duties at the rates established by the Division of
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(b) A member may decline to receive per diem and
expenses for the member's service.
(6) (a) The commission shall meet at least monthly,
(b) The director may call additional meetings:
(i) at the director's discretion;
(ii) upon the request of the chair; or
(iii) upon the written request of three or more
commission members.
(7) Three members of t h e commission constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business.
2005

61-2-6. Licensing procedures and requirements.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), the commission shall determine the qualifications and requirements
of applicants for:
(i) a principal broker license;
(ii) an associate broker license; or

721

SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE DIVISION

determine the honesty, integrity, truthfulness, reputation,
and competency of each applicant for an initial license or
for renewal of an existing license.
(c) (i) The division, with the concurrence of the commission, shall require an applicant for:
(A) a sales agent license to complete an approved educational program not to exceed 90
hours; and
(B) an associate broker or principal broker
license to complete an approved educational program not to exceed 120 hours.
(ii) The hours required by this section mean 50
minutes of instruction in each 60 minutes.
(hi) The maximum number of program hours
available to an individual is ten hours per day.
(d) The division, with the concurrence of the commission, shall require" the applicant to pass an examination
approved by the commission covering:
(i) the fundamentals of:
(A) the English language;
(B) arithmetic;
(C) bookkeeping; and
(D) real estate principles and practices;
(ii) the provisions of this chapter;
(iii) the rules established by the commission; and
(iv) any other aspect of Utah real estate license
law considered appropriate.
(e) (i) Three years'full-time experience as a real estate
sales agent or its equivalent is required before any
applicant may apply for, and secure a principal broker or associate broker license in this state.
(ii) The commission shall establish by rule, made
in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the criteria by which
the commission will accept experience or special
education in similar fields of business in lieu of the
three years' experience.
(2) (a) The division, with the concurrence of the commission, may require an applicant to furnish a sworn statement setting forth evidence satisfactory to the division of
the applicant's reputation and competency as set forth by
rule.
(b) The division shall require an applicant to provide
the applicant's Social Security number, which is a private
record under Subsection 63-2-302(l)(h).
(3) (a) A nonresident principal broker may be licensed in
this state by conforming to all the provisions of this
chapter except that of residency.
(b) A nonresident associate broker or sales agent may
become licensed in this state by:
(i) conforming to all the provisions of this chapter
except that of residency; and
(ii) being employed or engaged as an independent
contractor by or on behalf of a nonresident or resident
principal broker who is licensed in this state.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection 61-2-9(l)(e)(iv), an
applicant who has had a real estate license revoked:
(i) shall be relicensed as prescribed for an original
application; and
(ii) may not apply for a new license until at least
five years after the day on which the license is
revoked,
(b) In the case of an applicant for a new license as a
principal broker or associate broker, the applicant is not
entitled to credit for experience gained prior to the revocation of a real estate license.
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(i) review a class or category of applications for
initial or renewed licenses;
(ii) determine whether an applicant meets the licensing criteria in Subsection (1); and
(iii) approve or deny a license application without
concurrence by the commission,
(b) (i) If the commission delegates to the division the
authority to approve or deny an application without
concurrence by the commission and the division denies an application for licensure, the applicant who is
denied licensure maty petition the commission for
review of the denial of licensure.
(ii) An applicant who is denied licensure pursuant
to this Subsection (5) may seek agency review by the
executive director x>nly after the commission has
reviewed the division's denial of the applicant's application.
2005
61-2-7. Form of license — Display of license.
The division shall issue to each licensee a wall license
showing the name and address of the licensee. The seal of the
state shall be affixed to each license. Each license shall contain
any other matter prescribed by the division and shall be
delivered or mailed to the address furnished by the licensee.
The wall licenses of principal brokers, associate brokers, and
sales agents who are affiliated with an office shall be kept in
the office to be made available1 on request.
1991
61-2-7.1. Change of information — Failure to notify —
Notification to an applicant, licensee, or certificate holder.
(1) An applicant, licensee, or certificate holder shall send
the division a signed statement in the form required by the
division notifying the division within ten business days of any
change of:
(a) principal broker?
(b) principal business location;
(c) mailing address;
(d) home street address;
(e) an individual's name; or
(f) business name.
(2) The division may charge a fee established in accordance
with Section 63-38-3.2 for processing any notification of
change submitted by an applicant, licensee, or certificate
holder.
(3) (a) When providing the division a business location or
home street address, a physical location or street address
must be provided.
(b) When providing a mailing address, an applicant,
licensee, or certificate holder may provide a post office box
or other mailjdrop location.
(4) Failure to notify the division of a change described in
Subsection (1) is separate grounds for disciplinary action
against the applicant, licensee, or certificateholder.
(5) An applicant, licensee, or certificate holder is considered
to have received any notification that has been sent to the last
address furnished to the division by the applicant, licensee, or
certificate holder.
2005
61-2-7.2. Reporting requirements.
Principal brokers, associate brokers, and Sales agents shall
send the division a signed statement notifying the division of
the following within ten business days:
(1) conviction of any criminal offense; or
(2) filing a personal or brokerage bankruptcy.
2000
61-2-8. Discharge of associate broker or sales agent by
principal broker.— Notice.
If an associate broker or sales agent is discharged by a
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e discharge. The principal broker shall address a communition to the last-known residence address of that associate
oker or sales agent advising him that notice of his termina3n has been delivered or sent to the division. It is unlawful
r any associate broker or sales agent to perform any of the
:ts under this chapter, directly or indirectly, from and after
ie date of receipt of the termination notice until affiliation
ith a principal broker has been established.
2000
L-2-9. Examination and license fees — Background
check — Renewal of licenses — Education
requirements — Activation of inactive licenses — Recertification — Licenses of firm,
partnership, or association — Miscellaneous

fees.
(1) (a) Upon filing an application for a principal broker,
associate broker, or sales agent license examination, the
applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as determined by
the commission with the concurrence of the division under
Section 63-38-3.2 for admission to the examination.
(b) A principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent
applicant shall pay a nonrefundable fee as determined by
the commission with the concurrence of the division under
Section 63-38-3.2 for issuance of an initial license or
license renewal.
(c) Each license issued under this Subsection (1) shall
be issued for a period of not less than two years as
determined by the division with the concurrence of the
commission.
(d) (i) Any new sales agent applicant shall:
(A) submit fingerprint cards in a form acceptable to the division at the time the license application is filed; and
(B) consent to a fingerprint background check
by the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the application.
(ii) The division shall request the Department of
Public Safety to complete a Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal background check for each new
sales agent applicant through the national criminal
history system (NCIC) or any successor system.
(iii) The cost of the background check and the
fingerprinting shall be borne by the applicant.
(iv) Funds paid to the division by an applicant for
the cost of the background check shall be nonlapsing.
(e) (i) Any new sales agent license issued under this
section shall be conditional, pending completion of
the criminal background check. If the criminal background check discloses the applicant has failed to
accurately disclose a criminal history, the license
shall be immediately and automatically revoked.
(ii) Any person whose conditional license has been
revoked under Subsection (l)(e)(i) shall be entitled to
a post-revocation hearing to challenge the revocation.
The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(iii) The division director shall designate one of the
following to act as the presiding officer in a postrevocation hearing described in this Subsection (l)(e):
(A) the division; or
(B) the division with the concurrence of the
commission.
(iv) The decision on whether relief from the revocation of a license under this Subsection (l)(e) will be
granted shall be made by the presiding officer.
(v) Relief from a revocation under this Subsection
(1\{**\ m o w V»o oroYifo/1 rvnltr i-f*
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(I) did not occur; or
(II) is the criminal history of another person;
(B) (I) the revocation is based on a failure to
accurately disclose a criminal history; and
(II) the applicant had a reasonable good
faith belief at the time of application that
there was no criminal history to be disclosed;
or
(C) the division failed to follow the prescribed
procedure for the revocation.
(vi) If a revocation under this Subsection (l)(e) is
upheld after a post-revocation hearing, the person
may not apply for a new license until at least 12
months after the day on which the final decision
upholding the revocation is issued.
(2) (a) (i) A license expires if it is not renewed on or before
its expiration date.
(ii) As a condition of renewal, each active licensee
shall demonstrate competence:
(A) by viewing an approved real estate education video program and completing a supplementary workbook; or
(B) by completing 12 hours of professional
education approved by the division and commission within each two-year renewal period.
(iii) The division with the concurrence of the commission shall certify education which may include:
(A) state conventions;
(B) home study courses;
(C) video courses; and
(D) closed circuit television courses.
(iv) The commission with concurrence of the division may exempt a licensee from the education requirement of this Subsection (2)(a) for a period not to
exceed four years:
(A) upon a finding of reasonable cause, including military service; and
(B) under conditions established by rule made
in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) For a period of 30 days after the expiration date of
a license, the license may be reinstated uponu
(i) payment of a renewal fee and a late fee determined by the commission with the concurrence of the
division under Section 63-38-3.2; and
(ii) providing proof acceptable to the division and
the commission of the licensee having completed the
hours of education or demonstrated competence as
required under Subsection (2)(a).
(c) After the 30-day period described in Subsection
(2)(b), and until six months after the expiration date, the
license may be reinstated by: (i) paying a renewal fee and a late fee determined
by the commission with the concurrence of the division under Section 63-38-3.2;
(ii) providing to the division proof of satisfactory
completion of 12 hours of continuing education:
(A) in addition to the requirements for a
timely renewal; and
(B) on a subject determined by the commission
by rule made in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act;
and
(iii) providing proof acceptable to the division and
the commission of the licensee having:
(&} rnnrmlpfori the hnnrq of pdnrfltirnv nr
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(d) A person who does not renew that person's license
within six months after the expiration date shall be
relicensed as prescribed for an original application.
(3) (a) As a condition for the activation of an inactive
license that was in an inactive status at the time of the
licensee's most recent renewal, the licensee shall supply
the division with proof of:
(i) successftd completion of the respective sales
agent or broker licensing examination within six
months prior to applying to activate the license; or
(ii) the successful completion of 12 hours of continuing education that the licensee would have been
required to complete under Subsection (2)(a) if the
license had been on active status at the time of the
licensee's most recent renewal,
(b) The commission may, in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, establish by rule:
(i) the nature or type of continuing education required for reactivation of a license; and
(ii) how long prior to reactivation the continuing
education must have been completed.
(4) (a) A principal broker license may be granted to a
corporation, partnership, or association if the corporation,
partnership, or association has affiliated with it an individual who:
(i) has qualified as a principal broker under the
terms of this chapter; and
(ii) serves in the capacity of a principal broker,
(b) Application for the license described in Subsection
(4)(a) shall be made in accordance with the rules adopted
by the division with the concurrence of the commission.
(5) The division may charge and collect reasonable fees
determined by the commission with the concurrence of the
division under Section 63-38-3.2 to cover the costs for:(a) issuance of a new or duplicate license;
(b) license histories or certifications;
(c) certified copies of official documents, orders, and
other papers and transcripts;
(d) certifying real estate schools, courses, and instructors, the fees for which shall, notwithstanding Section
13-1-2, be deposited in the Real Estate Education,- Research, and Recovery Fund; and
(e) other duties required by this chapter.
(6) If a licensee submits or causes to be submitted a check,
draft, or other negotiable instrument to the division for
payment of fees, and the check, draft, or other negotiable
instrument is dishonored, the transaction for which the payment was submitted is void "and will be reversed by the
division if payment of tKe applicable fee is not received in full.
(7) (a) The fees under this chapter and the additional
license fee for the Real Estate Education, Research, and ^
Recovery Fund under Section 61-2a-4 are in lieu of all
other license fees or assessments that might otherwise be
imposed or charged by the state or any of its political
subdivisions, upon, or as a condition of, the privilege of
conducting the business regulated by this chapter, except
that a political subdivision within the state may charge a
business license fee on a principal broker if the principal
broker maintains a place of business within the jurisdiction of the political subdivision,
(b) Unless otherwise exempt, each licensee under this
chapter is subject to all taxes imposed under Title 59,
Revenue and Taxation.
2005
61-2-10* Restriction on commissions — Affiliation with
more than one ]broker — Specialized licenses
— Designation of agents or brokers.
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acts specified in this chapter from any person except the
principal broker with whom he is affiliated and licensed.
(2) An inactive associate broker or sales agent is not authorized to conduct real estate transactions until the inactive
associate broker or sales agent becomes affiliated with a
licensed principal broker and submits the required documentation to the division. An inactive" principal broker is not
authorized to conduct real estate transactions until the principal broker's license is activated with the division.
(3) No sales agent or associate broker may affiliate with
more than one principal broker at the same time.
(4) (a) Except as provided by rule, a principal broker may
not be responsible for more than one real estate brokerage
at the same time.
(b) In addition to issuing principal broker, associate
broker, and sales agent licenses authorizing the performance of all of the acts set forth in Subsection 61-2-2(12),
the division may issue specialized sales licenses and
speciahzed property management licenses with the scope
of practice limited to the specialty. An individual may hold
a specialized license in addition to a license to act as a
principal broker, an associate broker, or a sales agent. The
commission may adopt irules pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, for the
administration of this provision, including prelicensing
and postlicensing education requirements, examination
requirements, affiliation with real estate brokerages or
property management companies, and other ^licensing
procedures.
(c) An individual may not be a principal broker of a
brokerage and a sales agent or associate broker for a
different brokerage at the same time.
(5) Any owner, purchaser, lessor, or lessee who engages the
services of a principal broker may designate which, sales
agents or associate brokers affiliated with that principal
broker will also represent that owner, purchaser, lessor, or
lessee in the purchase, sale, lease, or exchange of real estate,
or in exercising an option rel ating to real estate.
1996
61-2-11. Investigations — Subpoena power of division
— Grounds for disciplinary action.
The division may investigate or cause to be investigated the
actions of any principal broker, associate broker, sales agent,
real estate school, course provider, or school instructor licensed or certified by this state, or of any applicant for
licensure or certification, or of any person who acts in any of
those capacities within this state. The division is empowered
to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require by subpoena duces tecum the production of books, papers, contracts,
records, other documents, or information considered relevant
to the investigation. The division may serve subpoenas by
certified mail. Each failure to respond to a subpoena is
considered as a separate violation of this chapter. The commission, with the concurrence of the director, may impose a
civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $500 per violation,
impose educational requirements, and suspend, revoke, place
on probation, or deny renewal, reinstatement, or reissuance of
any license or any certification if at any time the licensee or
certificate holder, whether acting as an agent or on his own
account, is found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(2) making any false promises of a character likely to
influence, persuade, or induce;
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course of misrepresentation, or of making false promises through agents,
sales agents, advertising, or otherwise;
(4) acting for more than one party in a transaction
without the informed consent of all parties;
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(b) representing or attempting to represent a broker other than the principal broker with whom the
person is affiliated; or
(c) representing as sales agent or having a contractual relationship similar to that of sales agent with
other than a licensed principal broker;
(6) (a) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for
or to remit any monies coming into the person's
possession that belong to others;
(b) commingling the funds described in Subsection
(6)(a) with the person's own; or
(c) diverting the funds described in Subsection
(6)(a) from the purpose for which they were received;
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable consideration, as
defined by the commission, to any person not licensed
under this chapter, except that:
(a) valuable consideration may be shared with a
licensed principal broker of another jurisdiction or as
provided under the Professional Corporation Act or
the Limited Liability Company Act; and
(b) the valuable consideration to be paid to a
licensee for the performance of any of the acts specified in this chapter may be paid by the licensee's
principal broker to the licensee's Sub-Chapter S corporation;
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal
broker, associate broker, or sales agent in such manner as
to safeguard the interests of the public;
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all documents
to all parties executing the documents;
(10) failing to keep and make available for inspection
by the division a record of each transaction, including:
(a) the names of buyers and sellers or lessees and
lessors;
(b) the identification of the property;
(c) the sale or rental price;
(d) any monies received in trust;
(e) any agreements or instructions from buyers
and sellers or lessees and lessors; and
(f) any other information required by rule;
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the purchase, sale,
or rental of property, whether the purchase, sale, or rental
is made for himself or for an undisclosed principal;
(12) regardless of whether the crime was related to real
estate, being convicted of a criminal offense involving
moral turpitude within five years of the most recent
application, including a conviction based upon a plea of
nolo contendere, or a plea held in abeyance to a criminal
offense involving moral turpitude;
(13) advertising the availability of real estate or the
services of a licensee in a false, misleading, or deceptive
manner;
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a licensee who
is a branch manager, failing to exercise reasonable supervision over the activities of the principal broker's or
branch manager's licensees and any unlicensed staff;
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of
the commission, or the rules adopted by the commission
and the division;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to
the licensee's principal in a real estate transaction;
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest
dealing;
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or
rule; or
MQl «jn<5-npn<sinr» rpvnratinn «mrrpndpr ar rflnrpllfltirm
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jurisdiction, based on misconduct in a professional capacity that relates to character, honesty, integrity, or truthfulness.
2005
61-2-11.5. Investigations related to an undivided fractionalized long-term estate.
In addition to any action authorized by Section 61-2-11, in
relationship to the offer or sale of an undivided fractionalized
long-term estate:
(1) the division may make any public or private investigation within or outside of this state as the division
considers necessary to determine whether any person has
violated, is violating, or is about to violate this chapter or
any rule or order under this chapter;
(2) to aid in the enforcement of this chapter or in the
prescribing of rules and forms under this chapter, the
division may require or permit any person to file a
statement in writing, under oath or otherwise as to all
facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be
investigated; and
(3) for the purpose of the investigation described in
Subsection (1), the division or any employee designated by
the division may:
(a) administer oaths and affirmation; or
(b) take any action permitted by Section 61-2-11
including:
(i) subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance;
(ii) take evidence; and
(iii) require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, agreement, or
other documents or records relevant or material
to the investigation.
2005
61-2-12. Disciplinary action — Judicial review.
(1) (a) On the basis of a violation of Section 61-2-11, the
division shall give notice to the licensee or certificate
holder and commence an adjudicative proceeding before:
(i) imposing an educational requirement;
(ii) imposing a civil penalty; or
(iii) taking any of the following actions related to a
license or certificate:
(A) revoking;
(B) suspending;
(C) placing on probation; or
(D) denying the renewal, reinstatement, or
reissuance.
(b) If the licensee is an active sales agent or active
associate broker, the division shall inform the principal
broker with whom the licensee is affiliated of the charge
and of the time and place of any hearing.
(c) If the presiding officer at a hearing determines that
any licensee or certificate holder is guilty of a violation of
this chapter, the division by written order may:
(i) with regard to the license or certificate:
(A) suspend;
(B) revoke;
(C) place on probation; or
(D) deny renewal, reinstatement, or reissuance; or
(ii) impose a civil penalty,
(2) (a) Any applicant, certificate holder, licensee, or person
aggrieved, including the complainant, may obtain agency
review by the executive director and judicial review of any
adverse ruling, order, or decision of the division.
(b) If the applicant, certificate holder, or licensee prevails in the appeal and the court finds that the state
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Title 78, Chapter 27a, Small Business Equal Access to
Justice Act.
(c) (i) An order, ruling, or decision of the division shall
take effect and become operative 30 days after the
service of the order, ruling, or decision unless otherwise provided in the order.
(ii) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the division
may stay enforcement of an order, ruling, or decision
in accordance with Section 63-46b-18.
(iii) The appeal shall be governed by the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(3) The commission and the director shall comply with the
rocedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Adminstrative Procedures Act, in all adjudicative proceedings. 2005
1-2-13. Grounds for revocation of principal broker's
license —Automatic inactivation of affiliated
associate brokers' and sales' agents licenses.
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chapter comoitted by any real estate sales agent or associate broker
mployed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on
lehalf of a licensed principal broker or committed by any
mployee, officer, or member of a licensed principal broker is
ause for the revocation, suspension, or probation of the
•rincipal broker's license, or for the imposition of a fine
gainst the principal broker in an amount not to exceed $500
ler violation.
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal broker
icense automatically inactivates every associate broker or
ales agent license granted to those persons by reason of their
iffiliation with the principal broker whose license was revoked
r suspended, pending a change of broker affiliation. A prinipal broker shall, prior to the effective date of the suspension
r revocation of his license, notify in writing every licensee
filiated with him of the revocation or suspension of his
icense.
1991
(1-2-13.5. Court-ordered discipline.
The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict; or
einstate the use of a license issued under this chapter if so
irdered by a court.
1997
(1-2-14. List of licensees to be available.
The division shall make available at reasonable cost a list of
he names and addresses of all persons licensed by it under
his chapter.
1983
(1-2-15,61-2-16. Repealed.

1973

(1-2-17. Penalty for violation of chapter.
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addition to
>eing subject to a license sanction or a fine ordered by the
ommission, is, upon conviction of a first violation, guilty of a
lass A misdemeanor. Any imprisonment shall be for a term
lot to exceed six months. If the violator is a corporation, it is,
ipon conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) Upon conviction of a second or subsequent violation, an
ndividual is guilty of a third degree felony. Imprisonment
hall be for a term not to exceed two years. If a corporation is
onvicted of a second or subsequent violation, it is guilty of a
hird degree felony.
(3) Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any member or
Lgent of a partnership or association, who personally partici>ates in or is an accessory to any violation of this chapter by
nch corporation, partnership, or association, is subject to the
>enalties prescribed for individuals.
(4) If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as
ommission, compensation, or profit by or in consequence of a
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not more than three times the iimount of money received, as
may be determined by the court This penalty may be sued for
in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recovered by any
person aggrieved for his own use and benefit.
(5) All fines imposed by the commission and the director
under this chapter shall, notwithstanding Section 13-1-2, be
deposited into the Real Estate Education, Research, and
Recovery Fund to be used in a manner consistent with the
requirements of the Real Estate Recovery Fund Act.
1993
61-2-18. Actions for recovery of compensation restricted.
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in any court
of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any act done or service rendered which is prohibited
under this chapter to other th*ui licensed principal brokers,
unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker at
the time of the doing of the act or rendering the service.
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own
name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation
for services as a sales agent or associate broker unless the
action is against the principal broker with whom he is or was
licensed. Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or
other compensation may only be instituted and brought by the
principal broker with whom the sales agent or associate
broker is affiliated.
1985
61-2-19. Repealed.

1983

61-2-20. Rights and privileges of real estate licensees.
'Real estate licensees may fill out only those legal forms
approved by the commission and the attorney general, and
those forms provided by statute, with the following exceptions:
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out
any documents associated vrith the closing of a real estate
transaction.
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real estate forms
prepared by legal counsel of thfe buyer, seller, lessor, or
lessee.
(3) If the commission and the attorney general have not
approved a specific form for the transaction, principal
brokers, associate brokers, and sales agents may fill out
real estate forms prepared by any legal counsel, including
legal counsel retained by ;the brokerage to develop these
forms.
1993
61-2-21. Remedies and action for violations.
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that any person
has been, is engaging in, or is about to engage in acts
constituting violations of this chapter, and if it appears to
the director that it would be in the pubhc interest to stop
such acts, the director shall issue and serve upon the
person an order directing that person to cease and desist
irom those acts.
(b) Within ten days after receiving the order, the pers o n upon whom the order is served may request an
adjudicative proceeding.
(c) Pending the hearing, any cease and desist order
shall remain in effect.
(d) If a request for a hearing is made, the division shall
follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
[2) (a) After the hearing, if the commission and the director
agree that the acts of the person violate this chapter, the
director:
(i) shall issue an order making the order issued
under Subsection (1) permanent} and
(ii) may impose a finer.
(b) If no hearing is requested and if the person fails to
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name of the Department of Commerce and the Division of
Real Estate, in the district court in the county in which
the acts occurred or where the person resides or carries on
business, to enjoin and restrain the person from violating
this chapter.
(c). The district courts of this state shall have jurisdiction of these suits.
(d) Upon a proper showing in an action brought under
this section related to an undivided fractionaHzed longterm estate, the court may:
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or
mandatory injunction;
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus;
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment;
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's assets;
(v) order disgorgement;
(vi) order rescission;
(vii) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each
violation of this chapter; and
(viii) enter any other relief the court considers just.
(e) The court m a y not require the division to post a
bond in a n action brought under this Subsection (2).
(3) The remedies and action provided in this section may
t interfere with, or prevent the prosecution of, any other
medies or actions including criminal proceedings.
2005

-2-22. Separability.
If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any
ovision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
mainder of this chapter shall not be affected thereby.
1985
-2-23.

Repealed.

-2-24.

M i s h a n d l i n g of t r u s t f u n d s .

1988

(1) The division may audit principal brokers' trust accounts
other accounts in which a licensee maintains trust funds
Lder this chapter. If the division's audit shows, in the opinion
the division, gross mismanagement, commingling, or mise of funds, the division, with the concurrence of the commissi, may order a complete audit of the account by a certified
Lblic accountant at the licensee's expense, or take other
tion in accordance with Section 61-2-12.
(2) The licensee may obtain agency review by the executive
rector or judicial review of any division order.
(3) If it appears that a person has grossly mismanaged,
mmingled, or otherwise misused trust funds, the division,
ith or without prior administrative proceedings, may bring
l action in the district court of the district where the person
sides or maintains a place of business, or where the act or
•actice occurred or is about to occur, to enjoin the acts or
•actices and to enforce compliance with this chapter or any
Je or order under this chapter. Upon a proper showing, the
urt shall grant injunctive relief or a temporary restraining
der, and may appoint a receiver or conservator. The division
not required to post a bond in any court proceeding.
1996
L-2-25. Sales agents — Affiliated with broker as independent contractors or employees — Presumption.
A sales agent may be affiliated with a licensed principal real
»tate broker either as an independent contractor or as an
nployee. The relationship between sales agent and broker is
"esumed to be an independent contractor relationship unless
Lere is clear and convincing evidence that the relationship
as intended by the parties to be an employer employee
Jationship.
2003
L-2-26. Rulemaking required for offer or sale of an
undivided fractionalized long-term estate —
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long-term estate shall comply with the disclosure requirements imposed by rules made by the commission under
this section.
(b) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shall
make rules as to the timing, form, and substance of
disclosures required to be made by a licensee or certificate
holder under this section.
(2) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shall make rules
imposing requirements for a management agreement related
to an undivided fractionaHzed long-term estate that makes
the offer or sale of the undivided fractionaHzed long-term
estate treated as a real estate transaction and not treated as
an offer or sale of a security under Chapter 1, Utah Uniform
Securities Act.
(3) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission shaU make rules
establishing:
(a) the disclosures required in the sale or offer of an
undivided fractionalized long-term estate that is subject
to a master lease;
(b) requirements for the management of a master lease
on an undivided fractionaHzed long-term estate; and
(c) the requirements on t h e structure of a m a s t e r lease
on a n undivided fractionaHzed long-term estate.
2005

61-2-27. Exclusive brokerage agreement.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Client" means a person who makes an exclusive
brokerage agreement with a principal broker under Subsection (l)(c).
(b) "Closed" means that:
(i) aU documents required to be executed under the
contract are executed;
(ii) aU monies required to be paid by either party
under the contract are paid in the form of collected or
cleared funds;
(iii) the proceeds of any new loan are deHvered by
the lender to the seUer; and
(iv) all appHcable documents are recorded in the
office of the county recorder for the county in which
the property is located.
(c) "Exclusive brokerage agreement" means a written
agreement between a cHent and a principal broker:
(i) (A) to Hst for sale, lease, or exchange:
(I) real estate;
(II) an option on real estate; or
(III) an improvement on real estate; or
(B) for representation in the purchase, lease,
or exchange of:
(I) real estate;
(II) an option on real estate; or
(III) an improvement on real estate;
(ii) that gives the principal broker the sole right to
act as the agent or representative of the cHent for the
purchase, sale, lease, or exchange of:
(A) real estate;
(B) an option on real estate; or
(C) an improvement on real estate; and
(iii) that gives the principal broker the expectation
of receiving valuable consideration in exchange for
the principal broker's services.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a principal
broker subject to an exclusive brokerage agreement shaU:
(i) accept deHvery of and present to the cHent offers
and counteroffers to buy, lease, or exchange the
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(iii) answer any question the client has concerning:
(A) an offer;
(B) a counteroffer;
(C) a notice; and
(D) a contingency.
(b) A principal broker subject to an exclusive brokerage
agreement need not comply with Subsection (2)(a) after:
(i) an agreement for the sale, lease, or exchange of
the real estate, option on real estate, or improvement
on real estate is:
(A) signed;
(B) all contingencies related to the sale, lease,
or exchange are satisfied or waived; and
(C) the sale, lease, or exchange is closed; or
(ii) the exclusive brokerage agreement expires or
terminates.
(3) A principal broker who violates this section is subject to
Section 61-2-17.
2005

CHAPTER 2a
REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND
Section
61-2a-l.
61-2a-2.
61-2a-3.
61-2a-4.
61-2a-5.

61-2a-6.
61-2a-7.
61-2a-8.
61-2a-9.
61-2a-10.
61-2a-ll.
61-2a-12.

Citation.
Purpose.
Education, Research, and Recovery Fund.
Additional license fee — Purpose.
Notice to division — Judgment against real estate licensee — Fraud, misrepresentation, or
deceit — Verified petition for order directing
payment from fund — Limitations and procedure.
Real Estate Division — Authority to act upon
receipt of petition.
Court determination and order.
Insufficient funds to satisfy judgments — Procedure and interest.
Division subrogated to judgment creditor — Authority to revoke license.
Failure to comply with all provisions constitutes
a waiver.
Director of Department of Commerce — Authority to take disciplinary action not limited.
Moneys accumulated — Excess set aside — Purpose.

61-2a-l. Citation.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Real
Estate Recovery Fund Act."
1975
61-2a-2. Purpose.
The purposes of this chapter are as follows:
(1) To establish a Real Estate Education, Research, and
Recovery Fund that shall reimburse the public out of the
fund for damages up to $10,000 caused by real estate
licensees in a real estate transaction. This chapter applies
< to damages caused by individual licensees. Reimbursement may not be made for judgments against corporations, partnerships, associations, or other legal entities.
(2) To provide revenue for improving the real estate
profession through education and research with the goal
of making real estate salesmen more responsible to the
public.

1989

61-2a-3. Education, Research, and Recovery Fund.
There is created a restricted special revenue fond to be
known as the "Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery

61-2a-5

fund. At the commencement of each fiscal year, $100,000 shall
be available in the fund for satisfying judgments rendered
against persons licensed under Title 61, Chapter 2, Division of
Real Estate.
2002
61-2a-4. Additional license fee — Purpose.
(1) Each person who applies for or renews a real estate
principal broker or associate broker license shall pay, in
addition to the application or renewal fee, a reasonable annual
fee of up to $18, as determined by the Division of Real Estate
with the concurrence of the Real Estate Commission.
(2) Each person who applies for or renews a real estate
sales agent license shall pay in addition to the application or
renewal fee a reasonable annual fee of up to* $12, as determined by the division with the concurrence of the commission.
(3) Notwithstanding Section 13-1-2, the additional fees
under this section shall be paid into the Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund to be used for the purposes
of this chapter.
1993
61-2a-5. Notice to division — Judgment against real
estate licensee — Fraud, misrepresentation,
or deceit — Verified petition for order directing payment from fund — Limitations and
procedure.
*
(1) A person may bring a cl'aim against the Real Estate
Education, Research, and Recovery Fund only if he sends a
signed notification to the Division of Real Estate at the time he
files an action against a real estate licensee alleging fraud,
misrepresentation, or deceit.. Within 30 days of receipt of the
notice, the division shall have an unconditional right to
intervene in the action. If the person making a claim against
the fund obtains a„ final judgment in a court of competent
jurisdiction in this state against the licensee based upon
fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit in any real estate transaction, the person making the claim may, upon termination of all
proceedings including appeals, file a verified petition in the
court where the judgment was entered for an order directing
payment from the Real Estate Education, Research, and
Recovery Fund for the uncollected actual damages included in
the judgment and unpaid. E,ecovery from the fund may not
include pimitive damages, attorney's fees, interest, or court
costs. Regardless of the number of claimants or parcels of real
estate involved in a transaction, the liability of the fond may
not exceed $10,000 for a single transaction and $50,000 for
any one licensee.
(2) A copy of the petition shall be served upon the Division
of Real Estate of the Department of Commerce, and an
affidavit of the service shall be filed with the court.
(3) The court shall conduct a hearing on the petition within
30 days after service. The petitioner shall recover from the
fund only if he shows all of the following:
(a) He is not the spouse of the judgment debtor or the
personal representative of the spouse.
(b) He has complied with this chapter.
(c) He has obtained a final judgment in the manner
prescribed under this section, indicating the amount of
the judgment awarded.
(d) He has proved the amount still owing on the judgment at the date of the petition.
(e) He has had a writ of execution issued upon the
judgment, and the officer executing the writ has made a
return showing that no property subject-to execution in
satisfaction of the judgment could be found. If execution is
levied against the property of the judgment debtor, the
petitioner shall show that the amount realized was insufficient -to satisfy the judgment, and shall indicate the

TabB

UTAH CODE
UNANNOTATED
2004
VOLUME 1

Complete through the
2004 THIRD SPECIAL SESSION

LexisNexis(

FRAUD

1269

(6) The Legislature may annually provide, in an appropriations act, legislative direction for anticipated expenditures of
the monies received, under this section.
2004

TITLE 25
FRAUD
Chapter
1. Fraudulent Conveyances [Repealed!.
2. Sale of Merchandise in Bulk [Repealed].
3. Leases and Sales of Livestock [Repealed].
4. Marketing Wool [Repealed].
5. Statute of Frauds.
6. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
CHAPTER 1
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES [REPEALED]
25-1-1 to 25-1-16. Repealed.

1988

CHAPTER 2
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK [REPEALED]
25-2-1 to 25-2-5* Repealed.

1965

CHAPTER 3
LEASES AND SALES OF LIVESTOCK [REPEALED]
25-3-1 to 25-3-4* Repealed.

1965

CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL [REPEALED]
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed.

1965

CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.
25-5-6.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
Representation as to credit of third person.
Promise to answer for obligation of another —
'When not required to be m vmtmg.
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected.
25-5-9.- Agent may sign for principal.
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for
a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
1953
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Section 25-5-1 shall not be construed to affect the power of
a fp^tator in the disno'sition of his real estate bv last will and

25-5-4

25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, orft>rthe sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
1953
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and
signed.
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in
writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement:
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making of the agreement;
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another;
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made
upon consideration of raarriage, except mutual promises
to marry;
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to
pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own
estate;
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation;
and
(f) every credit agreement.
(2) (a) As used in Subsection (l)(f) and this Subsection (2):
(i) (A) "Credit a{*reement" means an agreement by
a financial institution to:
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an
obligation to repay money, goods, or things in
action;
(II) otherwise extend credit; or
(III) make any other financial accommodation.
(B) "Credit agreement" does not include the
usual and customary agreements related to deposit accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated with deposit accounts or overdrafts,
(ii) "Creditor* means a financial institution which
extends credit or extends a financial accommodation
under a credit agreement with a debtor.
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains
credit, or seeks or receives a financial accommodation, under a credit agreement with a financial institution.
(iv) "Financial institution" means:
{K) a state or federal\y chartered:
(I) bank;
(II) savings and loan association;
(III) savings bank;
(IV) industrial bank; or
(V) credit union; or
(B) any other institution under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial Institutions
as provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act.
(t>) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(e), a debtor
or a creditor may not maintain an action on a credit
agreement unless the agreement:
(A) is in writing;
(B) expresses consideration;
(C) sets forth the relevant terms and conditions; and
;
(D) is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the agreement would be sought
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not customarily obtain an additional signed agreement from the debtor when granting the application.
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that
i credit Agreement is created, unless the agreement
satisfies the requirements of Subsection (2)(b):
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to
a debtor;
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other business relationships.
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly stated
typewritten or printed provision giving notice to the
debtor that the written agreement is a final expression of
the agreement between the creditor and debtor and the
written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of
any alleged oral agreement. The provision does not have
to be on the promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness that is tied to the credit agreement.
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature by the party to be charged if:
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the
terms of the agreement;
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the
credit offered shall constitute acceptance of those
terms; and
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the
debtor, or a person authorized by the debtor, requests
funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise
uses the credit offered.
2004
-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person.
To charge a person upon a representation as to the credit of
third person, such representation, or some memorandum
sreof, must be in writing subscribed by the party to be
arged therewith.
1953
-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another —
When not required to be in writing.
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in any of
e following cases is deemed an original obligation of the
omisor and need not be in writing:
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has received
property of another upon an undertaking to apply it
pursuant to such promise, or by one who has received a
discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in
consideration of such promise.
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or enters into
an obligation in consideration of the obligation in respect
to which the promise is made in terms or under circumstances such as to render the party making the promise
the principal debtor and the person in whose behalf it is
made his surety.
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon the consideration that the
party receiving it cancel the antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the
consideration that the party receiving it releases the
property of another from a levy or his person from
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained
upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration
beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either
party to the antecedent obligation or from another person.
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commission to sell
merchandise and to guarantee the sale.
(5) When the holder of an instrument for the payment
of money upon which a third person is or may become
~iy
14. 4 ^
•r\<»TmrtC
*£mf nf a rvrpredent debt of
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25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to be contracts in writing, and all communications sent by telegraph
and signed by the person sending the same, or by his authority, shall be deemed to be communications in writing.
1953
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected.
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof.
1953

25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal.
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter
to be subscribed by any party may be subscribed by the lawful
agent of such party.
1953
CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-2.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-6.
25-6-7.
25-6-8.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-11.
25-6-12.
25-6-13.
25-6-14.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or
after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before
transfer.
Transfer — When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief— Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Construction of chapter.
Applicability of chapter.
Restricting transfers of trust interests.

25-6-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act."

1988

25-6-2. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other
than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote;
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a
person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power
to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
not exercised the power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by the
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scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v.
Hammon, 560 R2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
_,.
,
,
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the date of notice of entry of such judgment,
rather than from the date of judgment. Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124,
288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank &
Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tblbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 R2d 703 (1965);
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P2d 486 (Utah

U n d e f f o S t u l e 73(h) the time for appeal ™»> ^
* * £ < ? > ™ ? ^ % S ^
from a default judgment in a city court ran from L u n d * B r o w n > 2 0 0 0 OT 75> n R 3 d 2 7 7 «

l i m

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §
265 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to
liability against defaulting defendant, 8
A.L.R.3d 1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and

hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.
Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial,
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only by
custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
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copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amendment substituted "move for summary judgment" for "move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor"
in Subdivisions (a) and (b); in Subdivision (c),
deleted "filed and served" before "in accordance
with" and substituted "Rule T for "CJA 4-501";
substituted "If" for "Should it appear to the

satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the
beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision
(g); and made stylistic changes throughout.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
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—Experts.
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—Inconsistency with deposition.
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Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
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Affirmative defense.
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Appeal.
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—Standard of review.
Applicability.
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Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Continuance for further discovery.

Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Effect of denial.
Evidence.
—Admissions of plaintiff.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Unsupported motion.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.
Improper party plaintiff.
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—Contract interpretation.
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—Deeds.
—Discovery of medical condition.
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—Lease as security.
—Notice.
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-1-1. Authority.

l.i. The following administrative Rules, applicable to the Division of Real Estate, Department of Commerce have been
tablished under the authority granted by Section 61-2-5.5, et seq.
1.1.1. The Division shall charge and collect fees for the (a) issuance of a new or duplicate license; (b) issuance of license
story or certifications; (c) issuance of certified copies of official documents, orders, and other papers and transcripts; (d)
rtification of real estate schools, courses and instructors; and (e) costs of administering other duties.
1.1.2. The authority to collect the above fees is authorized by Section 61-2-9(5) and Section 6i-2a- 4.
•1-2. Definitions.
1.2. Terms used in these rules are defined as follows:
1.2.1. Active Licensee: One who: (a) has paid all applicable license fees; and (b) is affiliated with a principal brokerage.
1.2.2. Branch Manager: An associate broker who manages a branch office under the supervision of the principal broker.
1.2.3. Branch Office: A real estate office affiliated with and operating under the same name as a Principal Brokerage but
ated at an address different from the main office.
1.2.4. Business Opportunity: The sale, lease, or exchange of any business which includes an interest in real estate.
1.2.5. Brokerage: A real estate sales brokerage or a property management company.
1.2.6. Certification: The authorization issued by the Division to: (a) establish and operate a real estate school which

provides courses approved for licensing requirements, (b) provide courses approved for renewal requirements, or (c)
unction as a real estate instructor.
1.2.7. Company Registration: A Registration issued to a corporation, partnership, Limited Liability Company, association
>r other legal entity of a real estate brokerage. A Company Registration is also issued to an individual or an individual's
>rofessional corporation.
1.2.8. Continuing Education: Professional education required as a condition of renewal in accordance with Subsection 61i-9(2)(a).

1.2.9. Credit hour: 50 minutes of instruction within a 60 minute period.
1.2.10 DBA (doing business as): The authority issued by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code to transact
msiness under an assumed name.
1.2.11. Distance Education: education in which the instruction does not take place in a traditional classroom setting, but
hrough other interactive instructional methods where teacher and student are separated by distance and sometimes by time,
nchiding computer conferencing, video conferencing, interactive audio, interactive computer software, Internet-based
nstruction, and other interactive online courses.
1.2.12. Expired License: A license will be deemed "expired" when the licensee fails to pay the fees due by the close of
msiness on the expiration date. If the expiration date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday the effective date of expiration
hall be the next business day.
1.2.13. Inactivation: The placing of a license on an inactive status, either voluntarily or involuntarily.
1.2.13.1. Voluntary inactivation means the process initiated by an active licensee terminating affiliation with a principal
brokerage.
1.2.13.2. Involuntary inactivation means the process of (a) inactivation of a sales agent or associate broker license resulting
rom the suspension, revocation, or non-renewal of the license of the licensee's principal broker, or death of the licensee's
>rincipal broker, or (b) inactivation of a sales agent or associate broker license by a principal broker when the licensee is
raavailable to execute the transfer forms.
1.2.14. Inactive Licensee: One who: (a) has paid all applicable license fees; and (b) is not affiliated with a principal
>rokerage.
1.2.15. Net listing means a listing wherein the amount of real estate commission is the difference between the selling price
•f the property and a minimum price set by the seller.
1.2.16. Non-resident Licensee: A person who holds a Utah real estate principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent
icense whose primary residence is in a jurisdiction other than Utah.
1.2.17. Principal Brokerage: The main real estate or property management office of a principal broker.
1.2.18. Property Management: The business of providing services relating to the rental or leasing of real property,
ncluding: advertising, procuring prospective tenants or lessees, negotiating lease or rental terms, executing lease or rental
greements, supervising repairs and maintenance, collecting and disbursing rents.
1.2.19 Provider: any person, professional organization, or other entity that is approved by the Division of Real Estate to
each Division-approved continuing education courses.
1.2.20. Regular Salaried Employees: For purposes of this Chapter, "regular salaried employee" shall mean an individual
mployed other than on a contract basis, who has withholding taxes taken out by the employer.
1.2.21. Reinstatement: To restore to active or inactive status, a license which has expired or been suspended.
1.2.22. Reissuance: The process by which a licensee may obtain a license following revocation.
1.2.23. Renewal: To extend an active or inactive license for an additional licensing period.
1.2.24 School: For the purposes of Rules R162-8 and R162-9, "school" includes:
(a) Any college or university accredited by a regional accrediting agency which is recognized by the United States
)epartment of Education;
(b) Any community college, vocational-technical school, state or federal agency or commission;
(c) Any nationally recognized real estate organization, any Utah real estate organization, or any local real estate

organization which has been approved by the Real Estate Commission; and
(d) Any proprietary real estate school.
1.2.25 Traditional Education: education in which instruction takes place between an instructor and students where all are
tiysically present in the same classroom.

estate business, licensing
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
Ira SACHS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Joseph S. LESSER, Loeb Investors Co. XL, United
Park City Mines Company,
Capital Growth Partners, and John Does 1-10,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20060257-CA.
May 17, 2007.
Background:
Shareholder brought breach of
contract action against company, its president, and
the chairman of the board of directors, seeking to
collect a finder's fee for finding buyer for all of
company's stock. The District Court, Salt Lake
Department, Tyrone E. Medley, J., granted
defendants
summary judgment. Shareholder
appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, McHugh, J., held
that:
(1) no express contract formed between the parties
due to a lack of a meeting of the minds as to the
amount of compensation;
(2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether there was a contract implied in fact,
precluding summary judgment;
(31 shareholder was not required to comply with the
Real Estate Broker's Act's licensing requirements in
finding stock buyer; and
(4) statute of frauds did not apply to alleged finder's
agreement.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
West Headnotes
£11 Contracts €^>15
95kl5 Most Cited Cases *
A binding contract can exist only where there has
been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their
intention to be bound by its terms.
[21 Contracts €=^9(1)
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases
A contract can be enforced only if the obligations of
the parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness
that it can be performed.
[31 Contracts €^>9(1)

Pagel

95k9(l) Most Cited Cases
Where a contract is so uncertain and indefinite that
the intention of the parties in material particulars
cannot be ascertained, the contract is void and
unenforceable.
[41 Brokers €=>7
65k7 Most Cited Cases
Generally, material terms of a broker or finder's
agreement include, but are not necessarily limited to:
(1) a description of the performance required of the
finder or broker, and (2) the amount of commission
or fee to be paid for the completed performance.
[51 Brokers €=>40
65k40 Most Cited Cases
Shareholder and chairman of company's -board of
directors never reached a meeting of the minds as to
the amount of compensation shareholder would be
due if he succeeded in finding a buyer for the
company, and thus, no express contract formed
between the parties.
[61 Contracts €=>27
95k27 Most Cited Cases
[61 Implied and Constructive Contracts © ^ 3 0
205Hk30 Most Cited Cases
[61 Implied and Constructive Contracts €=>55
205Hk55 Most Cited Cases
Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no
enforceable contract exists, and can take either of two
forms; the first is a claim for a contract implied in
fact, which is an actual contract established by
conduct, while the second, is a claim for a contract
implied in law or quasi-contract, which is not a
contract at all, but rather an action in restitution.
[71 Contracts € ^ 2 7
95k27 Most Cited Cases
Like express contracts, contracts implied in fact grow
out of the intention of the contracting parties and in
each case there must be a meeting of the minds
before there can be a contract.
[81 Contracts €=^>27
95k27 Most Cited Cases.
Unlike an express contract, recovery under a contract
implied in fact does not necessarily require that the
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parties agree on the contract price.

agreement.

[91 Contracts €=>27
95k27 Most Cited Cases
To prevail on a claim arising under a contract implied
in fact, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant
requested the plaintiff to perform the work; (2) the
plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or
her for those services; and (3) the defendant knew or
should have known that the plaintiff expected
compensation.

£151 Brokers €=>53
65k53 Most Cited Cases
With a business finder, the causation, or procuring
cause requirement for obtaining a finder's fee is
satisfied by the mere introduction, even if
negotiations are abandoned and later successfully
resumed, provided the renewed negotiations are
connected to and stemfromthe original introduction.

£10] Contracts €=>29
95k29 Most Cited Cases
Generally speaking, the existence of an implied-infact contract is a factual question committed to the
sound discretion of the jury.

£161 Brokers €=>2
65k2 Most Cited Cases
A "broker" not only introduces the parties to a
business opportunity but also negotiates on behalf of
one of the parties with the best interests of one such
party being his charge.

fin Appeal and Error €=>863
30k863 Most Cited Cases
On a review of summary judgment on a contract
implied in fact claim, the reviewing court retains the
power to decide whether, as a matter of law, a
reasonable jury could find that an implied contract
exists.

£171 Brokers €=>54
65k54 Most Cited Cases
A broker becomes entitled to his commission if,
through his direct and continuous actions, he
produces a buyer or seller who is ready, willing, and
able to complete the transaction on the principal's
terms.

T121 Contracts €^>27
95k27 Most Cited Cases

£181 Corporations €=>1.3
101kl.3 Most Cited Cases

[121 Contracts €^=>168
95kl68 Most Cited Cases
On a contract implied in fact claim, a plaintiff may
only recover the amount the parties can be said to
have reasonably intended as the contract price; if the
parties have left that amount unexpressed, courts will
infer the amount to be the reasonable value of the
plaintiffs services.

fl81 Corporations €=^182.1(1)
101kl82.im Most Cited Cases
Because a corporation exists* as a distinct legal entity,
when the corporation acquires property, the title vests
in it as a separate entity distinctfromits shareholders.

£131 Judgment €^181(31)
228kl81(31) Most Cited Cases
Genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether
there was a contract implied in fact between
shareholder and chairman of company's board of
directors and whether shareholder was responsible
for procuring buyer for company, precluding
summary judgment on shareholder's claim for a
finder's fee based on the implied contract to find
buyer for company.
£141 Brokers €^>53
65k53 Most Cited Cases
A business finder becomes entitled to his fee if his
introduction results in a transaction, irrespective of
whether a third person brings the parties to

fl91 Corporations €=^182.1(3)
101kl82.H3) Most Cited Cases
When a stockholder sells his stock, he is selling his
proprietary interest in a going concern and not an
interest in the corporate assets. West's U.CA. §
16-10a-102(33).
£201 Corporations €=^445.1
101k445.1 Most Cited Cases
Generally speaking, when all the assets of an ongoing
business are purchased, the purchaser does not
acquire the liabilities of the corporation as a stock
purchaser would.
£211 Corporations €=>182.1(1)
101kl82.1(n Most Cited Cases
£211 Corporations €^182.4(1)
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101kl82.4(l) Most Cited Cases
The purchaser in a corporate asset transaction takes
legal title to the property, but in a stock purchase
transaction the corporation's assets remain titled in
the corporation's name.
T221 Brokers €^>3
65k3 Most Cited Cases
Shareholder did not find a participant in a business
opportunity involving real property when he located a
buyer for all of company's stock, which company
existed for the sole purpose of owning and dealing in
real estate, and thus, he was not required to comply
with the Real Estate Broker's Act's licensing
requirements; the stock buyer gained only a
proprietary interest in a going concern and not an
interest in the company's real property since the
company continued to own, possess, and control the
real property throughout and following the merger
transaction. West's U.C.A. § § 61-2-2(141 61-2-18.
[23] Brokers € ^ > 3
65k3 Most Cited Cases
Agreements to broker corporate stock for
compensation do not fall within the scope of statute
of frauds provision regarding broker agreements to
sell real estate. West's U.C.A. § 25-5-4QYe).
[24] Brokers €=^43(2)
65k43(2) Most Cited Cases
Company's stock was considered personal property
rather than realty, and thus, alleged agreement
between shareholder and company, in which
shareholder would receive finder's fee if he found a
buyer for all of company's stock, was not subject to
the statute of frauds. West's U.C.A. § 25-5-4(l)(e).
*665 Kathrvn Collard, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Laura S. Scott, Shane D. Hillman. Jason D. Boren,
and Anthony C. Kave, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before BENCH. P.J., McHUGH and THORNE. JJ.
OPINION
McHUGH. Judge:
f 1 Plaintiff Ira Sachs appeals the district court's
order granting summary judgment to Defendants
Joseph S. Lesser, Loeb Investors Co. XL, and United
Park City Mines Company on Sachs's claims to
recover a finder's fee. We affirm in part and reverse
and remand in part.
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BACKGROUND FPNll
FN1. We note that many of the facts are
hotly disputed. When "there is a factual
dispute, we view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party," Ouaid v.
U.S. Healthcare. Inc., 2007 UT 27. T 8. 158
P.3d 525. in this instance, Sachs; and "[w]e
recite the facts accordingly," Sanders v.
Leavitt. 2001 UT 78. % 1 n. 1.37 P.3d 1052.
f 2 This appeal arises from a dispute over Sachs's
claim to afinder'sfee for a transaction culminating in
the purchase of all the outstanding stock of United
Park City Mines (UPCM) by Capital Growth
Partners, L.L.C. (Capital). At the time these events
began in 1999, UPCM was a publicly held
corporation involved in the leasing, development, and
sale of real property located in and around Park City,
Utah. Loeb Investors Co. XL (Loeb) was the
controlling shareholder of UPCM, and Defendant
Joseph S. Lesser served as both the Chairman of the
Board of Directors of UPCM and President of Loeb.
Hank Rothwell was the President of UPCM. Sachs
was a shareholder in UPCM and worked as a
business consultant in Park City.
f 3 In 1999, UPCM, acting under Rothwell's
direction, entered into a letter of understanding with
DMB Associates, Inc. (DMB), to form a joint venture
to develop resort projects in Park City on a portion of
UPCM's property. HFN21 The joint venture formed in
June 2000. After attempts to agree on a business plan
failed, the joint venture dissolved in January 2001,
leaving UPCM obligated to pay DMB approximately
$2.5 million in development costs and accrued
interest.
FN2. UPCM's only significant corporate
asset is its real property holdings which
include more than 8300 acres of land, of
which approximately 5300 are leased to
Deer Valley and Park City Mountain Resorts
for skiing and related purposes.
f 4 Upon learning that the joint venture between
UPCM and DMB had failed, Sachs contacted one of
his clients, Granite Land Company (Granite), and
introduced Granite to UPCM as a potential joint
venturer to take the place of DMB in developing the
resort projects. Around March 2001, Granite and
UPCM signed a confidentiality agreement allowing
them to exchange information related to a possible
joint venture.
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f 5 On May 2, 2001, Sachs traveled to New York to
meet with Lesser, the chairman of UPCM's board of
directors. At the meeting, Lesser expressed his
displeasure regarding Rothwell's handling of the
failed UPCM joint venture with DMB. Lesser
indicated that he represented eighty-five percent of
UPCM's shareholders, and that those shareholders
had lost faith in Rothwell and did not want to invest
any more money in UPCM. Lesser then asked Sachs
to locate a joint venturer or purchaser for UPCM as
quickly as possible, regardless of whether it was
Granite, another party, or a combination. Although
no specific amount of a finder's fee was discussed at
the meeting, Lesser told Sachs that UPCM intended
to engage Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Inc.
(Dresdner) as a broker and that Sachs would not be
entitled to a commission if Dresdner found a buyer
for UPCM. During the conversation, Lesser did not
mention or exclude any other persons or entities that
could be approached as potential joint venturers or
purchasers for UPCM aside from Dresdner and its
contacts.
f 6 Following his meeting with Lesser, Sachs sent a
letter to Rothwell on May 17, 2001, memorializing
aspects of the New York *666 meeting. The letter
included a reference to Sachs's expectation of a
finder's fee for his services in locating a joint venturer
for UPCM. The letter stated:
I am delighted that my introducing [UPCM] to
Granite ... appears to be headed in the right
direction and I am pleased that the confidentiality
letter has been signed. I certainly will continue to
do everything in my power to bring together a
mutually satisfactory agreement between these two
parties. I took the opportunity to express this
commitment to your chairman, [Lesser],... in early
May.
In that lunch with [Lesser], I was delighted to find
that he seems to share our enthusiasm for this joint
venture. I hope that this feeling is generally shared
by the rest of your board.... [Lesser] gave me his
encouragement to "get the job done."
I write this letter to remind you that I will expect a
modest finder's fee if an agreement comes to
fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime
developed lots in the new project, or some other
consideration acceptable to both of us. While I
believe we have an understanding as to this finder's
fee, I do think that matters of this sort ought to be
out on the table early on, and I hope you feel the
same.
Please let me know if you have any questions
concerning such finder's fee.
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Later that same day, Rothwell transmitted the letter
to Lesser. Lesser telephoned and informed Sachs that
he did not want a joint venture partner for UPCM but
was, instead, only interested in a purchaser.
f 7 The next day, Sachs followed up on this
telephone conversation by sending a second letter to
Rothwell clarifying Lesser's preference for a
purchaser. The second letter stated:
I understand, after a conversation yesterday with
[Lesser], that his preference would be to sell the
company rather than enter into a joint venture....
Happily, if your company's preference is sale,
Granite, as I suggested in yesterday's letter is still
an excellent prospect. Another investor, together
with Granite, would make an excellent purchaser.
I am happy to re-direct my focus to obtaining such
a joint venture purchaser.
Obviously, I will keep you apprised of all
proposals, whether for sale or for a joint venturing
of die project.
f 8 During this time, Sachs was also contacting
several individuals regarding the purchase of UPCM.
One of those people was Gerald Jackson, a real estate
developer who had previously worked in Park City.
During their initial conversation, Sachs conveyed to
Jackscm what he had learned from Lesser in New
York, including Lesser's disappointment with
Rothwell and Lesser's strong desire to sell UPCM
instead of enter into a joint venture. Jackson thanked
Sachs for the information and expressed interest in
buying UPCM. Jackson told Sachs that he would like
to "take [the UPCM] deal down with some
institutional and other investors." Because Lesser
had told Sachs that all interested parties should be
referred to Rothwell, Sachs asked Jackson to contact
Rothwell. Sachs also suggested that Jackson sign a
confidentiality agreement so that Jackson could
obtain information relevant to the purchase of UPCM
and would be registered as one of Sachs's contacts.
In addition, Sachs invited Jackson to contact Granite
and offered to inquire whether Granite was interested
in joining Jackson in a bid to purchase UPCM.
During this initial conversation, Jackson never
informed Sachs that he was already acquainted with
Rothwell through prioi business and social
relationships or that he was already pursuing a
purchase of UPCM directly with Rothwell. Rather,
Jackson told Sachs that he would contact Rothwell
and sign a confidentiality agreement.
f 9 Shortly thereafter, Sachs contacted Rothwell and
informed him of Jackson's interest in putting together
a group of investors to purchase UPCM. Sachs told
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Rothwell that Jackson became interested in
purchasing UPCM upon learning from Sachs that
Lesser was eager to sell. During this conversation,
Rothwell never mentioned that he and Jackson were
already engaged in negotiations concerning the sale
of UPCM. As promised, Sachs also contacted Granite
about *667 the possibility of affiliating with Jackson
to purchase UPCM. And Jackson, acting on Sachs's
suggestion, also contacted Granite.
f 10 On June 4, 2001, Sachs wrote to Jackson
asking to be updated when Jackson contacted
Rothwell or entered into a confidentiality agreement
with UPCM. Jackson responded by telephoning and
informing Sachs that he had already contacted
Rothwell. On July 9, 2001, Jackson, acting through
Aspen Ranch Corp., entered into a confidentiality
agreement with Dresdner, who by that time was
UPCM's investment banking firm. On July 31, 2001,
Jackson helped form Capital, a Utah limited liability
company, for the express purpose of purchasing
UPCM.
f 11 From late July 2001, through the end of the
year, Sachs frequently inquired about Jackson's
progress in purchasing UPCM; however, Sachs was
not personally involved in negotiating the deal. In
late October 2001, Capital entered into a nondisclosure agreement with Dresdner to pursue a
proposed acquisition of all the outstanding shares of
UPCM. Four months later, Capital formally offered
to purchase UPCM from its current shareholders.
After reading a newspaper article about the offer,
Sachs sent a facsimile to Rothwell which stated
"completion of task."
f 12 About this time, in February 2002, Jackson
telephoned Sachs and discussed Sachs's role in
soliciting Jackson as a purchaser for UPCM. Jackson
confirmed that Sachs was responsible for introducing
Jackson to the deal and also stated that he had no
problem with Sachs receiving a finder's fee on the
transaction. Following this conversation with
Jackson, Sachs began contacting Rothwell and Craig
Terry, an attorney for UPCM, in an attempt to secure
payment of a finder's fee for the transaction.
<j[ 13 In June 2003, Capital purchased all the
outstanding common stock of UPCM, by way of
merger with its wholly owned subsidiary, CGP
Acquisition, Inc. In the merger, UPCM, the surviving
corporation, became a wholly owned subsidiary of
Capital and retained all of its assets and liabilities,
including its real estate assets. Following the
completion of the transaction, Sachs continued to
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seek a finder's fee from UPCM. On August 11, 2003,
Sachs again spoke with Jackson who expressed
surprise that Dresdner received a finder's fee for the
transaction instead of Sachs. Jackson reiterated that
Sachs, and not Dresdner, had solicited him as a
purchaser. Shortly after this exchange, Sachs faxed
additional requests for payment to Rothwell at
UPCM. Rothwell eventually returned a facsimile
with a notation that stated: "Ira [Sachs]~[UPCM]
does not agree with your agency argument. [Jackson]
and I had discussed [UPCM] for years! We viewed
you as a representative of Granite... only!" IPN31
FN3. In his deposition testimony, Lesser
conceded that if Sachs had been responsible
for introducing Jackson to UPCM, Sachs
would have been entitled to a finder's fee.
f 14 In January 2004, Sachs brought suit against
Lesser, Loeb, UPCM, and Capital in an effort to
collect afinder'sfee for the sale of UPCM to Capital.
Among other things, Sachs alleged breach of an
express oral contract or, in the alternative, recovery
under theories of contract implied in fact and contract
implied in law. [FN41 Lesser, Loeb, and UPCM
(collectively Defendants) moved for summary
judgment. [FN51 The trial court granted Defendants'
motion, finding the undisputed facts did not support
Sachs's claim for breach of an express finder's fee
agreement because there was no meeting of the
minds on the essential terms of the contract,
including the amount of the fee. The trial court found
that Sachs's claim for contract implied in fact
similarly failed for a lack of definiteness. *668
Turning to Sachs's claim for contract implied in law,
the trial court determined that Utah's statutes relating
to the licensing of real estate brokers, see Utah Code
Ann. S§ 61-2-1 to -27 (2006) (UREBA), and Utah's
statute of frauds, see Utah Code Ann. § § 25-5-1 to 9 (1998 & Supp.2006), barred Sachs's claim. 1TN61
The trial court concluded that because Sachs was not
a licensed real estate broker in Utah and there was no
written memorandum of the parties' agreement, any
claim for a finder's fee was barred by both UREBA
and the statute of frauds as a matter of law. Sachs
appealed.
FN4. Although the trial court refers to
Sachs's contract implied in law claim as a
claim for quantum meruit, we use the term
"quantum meruit" to refer to both branches
of that doctrine: 1) contract implied in fact;
and 2) contract implied in law. See Scheller
v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971. 975 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). We refer to the theories
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individually when only one is relevant to the
discussion.
FN5. Capital was granted summary
judgment on the ground that the undisputed
facts could not support Sachs's claim for
corporate successor liability. Sachs does not
appeal this determination; we therefore
limit our review to the claims against
Defendants.
FN6. The trial court also determined that
Sachs's claims for breach of express contract
and recovery under contract implied in fact
were similarly barred by UREBA and the
statute of frauds.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
% 15 Sachs argues that the trial court erred in
granting Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only where (1)
'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and
(2) 'the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.' " Poteet v. Wliite, 2006 UT 63, <f 7,
147 P.3d 439 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
Therefore, "[w]e review the district court's decision
to grant summary judgment for correctness, granting
no deference to the [district] court." Swan Creek Vill.
Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, f 16, 134
P.3d 1122 (second alteration in original) (quotations
omitted).
ANALYSIS
f 16 On appeal, Sachs alleges multiple points of
error. First, Sachs argues that summary judgment
was inappropriate because material issues of fact
remain unresolved with respect to his claims for
express oral contract and contract implied in fact.
Next, Sachs contends that the trial court erred when it
determined that UREBA applied to an acquisition of
all of UPCM's outstanding stock thereby barring his
express oral contract, contract implied in fact, and
contract implied in law. Finally, Sachs asserts the
trial court erred when it concluded that the statute of
frauds barred his claims. We affirm in part and
reverse and remand in part.
I. Express Contract
f 17 Sachs argues that the trial court erred when it
dismissed his express contract claim on the ground
that no meeting of the minds occurred on the material
terms of the contract. We affirm.
m m m f 18 "A binding contract can exist only
where there has been mutual assent by the parties
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manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms.
Furthermore, a contract can be enforced ... only if the
obligations of the parties are set forth with sufficient
definiteness that it can be performed." Bunnell v.
Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962)
(footnote omitted), overruled on other grounds by
Leish Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293
(Utah 1982): see also Carter v. Sorenson, 2004 UT
33, f 7, 90 P.3d 637 ("A contract ... must have
definite terms ... or else it cannot be enforced by a
court."). "[W]here a contract is so uncertain and
indefinite that the intention of the parties in material
particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void
and unenforceable." Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316,
1319 (Utah 1976): see also Utah Golf Ass'n v. City
ofN. Salt Lake, 2003 UT 38, % 13, 79 P.3d 919 ("An
unenforceable agreement to agree occurs when
parties to a contract fail to agpree on material terms of
the contract 'with sufficient definiteness to be
enforced.' " (emphasis added) (quoting Cottonwood
Mall Co, v. Sine. 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988))).
[41 f 19 Generally, material terms of a broker or
finder's agreement include, but are not necessarily
limited to: (1) a description of the performance
required of the finder or broker, and (2) the amount
of commission or fee to be paid for the completed
performance. See Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243,188 P.
640, 642 (1920) (recognizing that material terms of a
finder or broker's agreement include "the terms and
conditions of his employment, if any, and the amount
of his commission, etc."); CJ. Realty, Inc. v. Witlev,
758 P.2d 923. 928 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (outlining
"critical terms of afinder'sagreement" to include "the
finder, the finder's clients, the *669 property owner
who will owe a commission to the finder if a
transaction is closed with any of the finder's clients,
and the commission rate").
£51 f 20 Here, summary judgment was appropriate
because the parties did not reach a meeting of the
minds as to the amount of compensation due should
Sachs succeed in finding a buyer for UPCM. See
Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d
285, 290-91 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (recognizing,
implicitly, that the amount of a finder's fee is an
essential term of a finder's contract and determining
• that the parties agreement on a "reasonable" fee
would be sufficiently definite to enforce where prior
contract and future contract gave guidance as to what
the parties considered reasonable). Although it is
undisputed that Sachs sent a letter on May 17, 2001,
indicating his willingness to accept "a modest finder's
fee" in the form of "cash, a couple of prime
developed lots in the new project, or some other
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consideration acceptable to both [parties,]" Sachs has
failed to point to any facts that could support his
contention that the parties actually agreed to the
"modest" fee or to any other specific form or amount
of compensation. Rather, it is undisputed that at the
May 2, 2001 meeting, Sachs and Lesser did not
discuss any specific amount of finder's fee.
Additionally, Sachs admits that he did not have any
specific compensation in mind when he drafted the
letter and instead "was trying to draw [Rothwell] out
to come up with something." It is also undisputed
that, following the letter, the parties never agreed to
the form or a specific amount of compensation.
Therefore, Sachs's express contract claim fails as a
matter of law because there was no meeting of the
minds on the essential term of the fee to be paid.
IPN71
FN7. Sachs also argues that the May 17
letter was a written offer that Lesser
accepted when he told Sachs to find a buyer,
not a joint venturer. We disagree. "A
manifestation of willingness to enter into a
bargain is not an offer if the person to whom
it is addressed knows or has reason to know
that the person making it does not intend to
conclude a bargain until he has made a
further
manifestation
of
assent."
Restatement (Second) Contracts §
26
(1981).
II. Contract Implied in Fact
[6[f 21 We now turn to the question of whether
summary judgment was proper on Sachs's contract
implied in fact claim. "Recovery under quantum
meruit presupposes that no enforceable contract
exists," and can take either of two forms. Scheller v.
Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971. 975 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). The first is a claim for a contract
implied in fact, which "is an actual contract
established by conduct." /& The second, is a claim
for a contract implied in law or "quasi-contract,"
which is "not a contract at all, but rather an action in
restitution." IcL_
% 22 The trial court granted summary judgment on
Sachs's contract implied in fact claim on the same
ground it disposed of the express contract claim-that
there was no meeting of the minds on the essential
terms of a finder's fee agreement. Sachs argues that
the trial court erred because it is not necessary, under
a contract implied in fact theory, to prove a meeting
of the minds on each essential term of a finder's fee
agreement. We agree.

f7][8ir91 f 23 Like express contracts, contracts
implied in fact "grow out of the intention of the
contracting parties and in each case there must be a
meeting of the minds before there can be a contract."
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 696
n.l (Utah 1976) (plurality) (quotations omitted).
However, unlike an express contract, recovery under
a contract implied in fact does not necessarily require
that the parties agree on the contract price. See
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 267-69 (Utah
Ct.App.1987) (allowing recovery under contract
implied in fact where express contract claim was
defeated for failure to show a meeting of the minds as
to contract price). Instead, to prevail on a claim
arising under a contract implied in fact, a plaintiff
must show: "(1) the defendant requested the plaintiff
to perform the work; (2) the plaintiff expected the
defendant to compensate him or her for those
services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have
known that the plaintiff expected compensation."
Scheller, 753 P.2d at 975: accord Davies, 746 P.2d
at 269.
*670 n o i n n f
24 Generally speaking, "[t]he
existence of an implied-in-fact contract is a factual
question committed to the sound discretion of the
jury-" Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d
303, 306 (Utah 1992). However, on a review of
summary judgment, the court "retains the power to
decide whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable jury
could find that an implied contract exists."
Idi
accord Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App
100,^ 6,46P.3d247. Under this standard, summary
judgment is appropriate only where "a reasonable
jury cannot find that an implied contract exists."
Sanderson. 844 R2d at 306.
fl2iri31 f 25 Here, there are disputed facts as to
whether there was a contract implied in fact. HFN81
On two occasions, Lesser requested Sachs to find a
buyer for UPCM. JFN91 The first time, at the meeting
in New York and second when Lesser admonished
Sachs that he wanted a buyer, not a joint venturer.
Further, Sachs clearly expected to be compensated
for his services and both UPCM and Loeb knew or
should have known that. Sachs directly apprised
UPCM of his expectation of a modest finder's fee
when he sent the letter to Rothwell, the president of
UPCM, on May 17, 2001. The letter, which
specifically stated that '![, Sachs,] will expect a
modest finder's fee if an agreement comes to
fruition," was transmitted to Lesser; so, it can be
inferred that Lesser was also aware that Sachs
expected a fee. When viewing these facts in a light
most favorable to Sachs, as we must, see Ouaid v.
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U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 2007 UT 27. <f 8. 158 P.3d
525, we cannot say that no reasonable jury could find
that an implied-in-fact contract exists. Thus, the
issue should not have been "take[n] from the jury"
where, as here, "there is ... evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could infer" the truth of the claim.
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,
1293 (Utah Ct.App. 1996).
FN8. Even if Sachs should prevail on his
contract implied in fact claim, he may only
recover "the amount the parties can be said
to have reasonably intended as the contract
price." Scheller, 753 P.2d at 975. If "the
parties have left that amount unexpressed,
courts will infer the amount to be die
reasonable value of the plaintiffs services."
Id^ If the trial court reaches the question of
reasonable value, it should consider, among
other things, that Sachs testified that he
spent no more than ten hours identifying
Jackson as a buyer for UPCM.
FN9. We continue to state the facts in the
light most favorable to Sachs, the nonmoving party, see Sanders, 2001 UT 78 at %
1 n. 1, 37 P.3d 1052, but note that there are
disputed questions of fact as to whether
Lesser was acting in his capacity as the
Chairman of the Board of UPCM, President
of Loeb, or both, or neither, when he
requested that Sachs find a buyer for UPCM.
f 26 Defendants argue alternatively that we should
affirm the trial court's summary judgment in favor of
Defendants on Sachs's express and implied-in-fact
contract claims because Sachs cannot prove that he
was responsible for procuring Jackson as a buyer of
UPCM. Because the role of a finder is much more
limited than that of a broker, we disagree.
ri4iri51 1 27 A "finder" is one who, for a fee,
"find[s], introduce^] and bring[s] together parties to
a business opportunity, leaving ultimate negotiations
and consummation of [the] business transaction to the
principals." Black's Law Dictionary 437 (abridged
6thed.l991); see also Lezros v. Tarr, 44 Ohio St.3d
1. 540 N.E.2d 257. 263 (1989). A business finder,
therefore, becomes entitled to his fee "if his
introduction results in a transaction, irrespective of
whether a third person brings the parties to
agreement." Legros, 540 N.E.2d at 262; see also
Amerofina. Inc. v. U.S. Indus.. Inc., 232 Pa.Super.
394. 335 A.2d 448. 452 (1975): cf. Diversified Gen.
Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course. 584 P.2d 848. 850
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(Utah 1978) (noting that depending on the terms of
the agreement, a broker may "be required to effect a
sale or merely produce a customer " (emphasis
added)); C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P.2d 923.
925 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (holding recovery of
commission possible where agreement required only
that finder supply list of purchasers, one of whom
buys property). JFNiOl
FN10. With a finder, "the causation, or
'procuring cause' requirement is satisfied by
the mere introduction, even if negotiations
are abandoned and later successfully
resumed, provided the renewed negotiations
are connected to and stem from the original
introduction." Lezros v. Tarr, 44 Ohio St.3d
1. 540 N.E.2d 257. 263 (1989): see also
Amerofina, Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 232
Pa.Super. 394. 335 A.2d 448. 453 (1975)
("[I]f afinderintroduces a prospective buyer
and seller who enter upon merger
negotiations which are suspended and later
resumed, thefinderis still entitled to a fee if
the renewed negotiations ... directly result
from the original introduction." (second
alteration in original) (quotations omitted)).
*671 f!6iri71 f 28 Conversely, a broker "not only
introduces the parties but also negotiates on behalf of
one of the parties with the best interests of one such
party being his charge." Lesros, 540 N.E.2d at 262.
A broker becomes entitled to his commission if,
through his direct and continuous actions, he
produces a buyer or seller who is ready, willing, and
able to complete the transaction on the principal's
terms. See Butterfield v. Consolidated Fuel Co., 42
Utah 499. 132 P. 559.561 (1913) ("Before the broker
can be said to have earned Ms commissions, he must
produce a purchaser who is ready and willing to enter
into a contract upon his employer's terms."
(quotations omitted)); see also Amerofina, 335 A.2d
at 453 ("In the brokerage case the broker must be the
procuring cause of a ready, willing [,] and able buyer
who purchases on the terms and at the price
designated by the principal.").
f 29 Therefore, while bothfindersand brokers must
demonstrate that they are the "procuring cause" of the
transaction to recover their fee or commission, the
term "procuring cause" has different meanings with
respect to finders and brokers. These distinctions are
important here because Sachs need only demonstrate
that he introduced the parties who eventually
consummated the transaction. See Link-Hellmuth,
Inc. v. Carey. 101 Ohio App.3d 604.656 N.E.2d 358.
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362 (1995) (noting that "[i]t is possible for a finder to
accomplish his service by making only two phone
calls and, if the parties later conclude a deal, he is
entitled to his commission"); cf. Frederick May &
Co. v. Dunn. 13 Utah 2d 40. 368 P.2d 266. 269
(1962) ("The fact that the sale was consummated
without participation by the [middleman] in the final
negotiation does not preclude him from recovering
his commission if the sale was otherwise procured by
him.").

UPCM and contacted Granite only after speaking
with Sachs and that he knew, at some point, that
Sachs expected a commission. Nevertheless, Jackson
did nothing to inform Sachs that he was already
working *672 with Rothwell. According to Sachs,
Jackson even made statements that he believed Sachs
would receive a commission, and that he had no
problem with that. While we recognize that these
disputed facts do not directly contradict Rothwell's
and Jackson's deposition testimonies, when viewed as
a whole and in a light most favorable to Sachs, they
are sufficient to place into dispute the question of
whether Sachs or Rothwell was responsible for
procuring Jackson as a buyer. fFNll]

% 30 Sachs's deposition testimony places in dispute
whether, as a finder, he was the procuring cause of
the sale of UPCM to Capital. See Nyman v.
McDonald. 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct.App.1998)
(" 'One sworn statement under oath [involving a
material fact] is all that is necessary to create a
factual issue, thereby precluding summary judgment.*
Such sworn statements include deposition testimony
that is before the trial court on summary judgment."
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Although
it is undisputed that Jackson and Rothwell were
acquainted, both professionally and socially, before
the sale of UPCM to Capital, and that they both have
testified that Rothwell introduced Jackson to the deal,
Sachs has identified additional disputed facts that
place Jackson's and Rothwell's testimonies into
question. These facts, if believed, could support a
finding that Sachs was the procuring cause of the
transaction.
f 31 First, Sachs claims that he independently
developed
proprietary
information
through
correspondence and dialogue with Rothwell and
Lesser that UPCM was for sale, not merely seeking
joint venture partners, and that Lesser was
dissatisfied with Rothwell's management of UPCM.
Sachs conveyed this information to Jackson who
expressed an interest in purchasing UPCM. Sachs
then urged Jackson to contact Rothwell at UPCM,
sign a confidentiality agreement, and register as
Sachs's contact. During their initial conversation,
Jackson never informed Sachs that he was already
pursuing the deal directly with Rothwell. Sachs's
deposition testimony also outlines persistent
correspondence, by telephone, fax, and letter, with
Jackson from before execution of the confidentiality
agreement until after completion of the merger.
f 32 Additionally, neither Jackson nor Rothwell
have produced or recall any documentary evidence,
predating Sachs's initial conversation with Jackson,
that corroborates that Rothwell interested Jackson in
the UPCM transaction. Jackson admits that he
entered into the confidentiality agreement with

FN11. By so holding, we merely conclude
that summary judgment was inappropriate.
"We do not necessarily say that [Sachs's]
claims have merit.
They may not.
However, in 'reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.' " Francisconi v. Union Pacific R.R..
2001 UT App 350. <f 17 n. 4, 36 P.3d 999
(quoting Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage
Inc.. 2000 UT 12. % 2. 995 P.2d 599).
IE. Utah Real Estate Broker's Act
f 33 Defendants also argue that summary judgment
on Sachs's express contract claims as well as his
quantum meruit claims, for both contract implied in
fact and contract implied in law, was proper for the
independent reason that Utah's real estate broker's act
(UREBA or the Act), see Utah Code Ann. § § 61-2-1
to -27, bars Sachs from collecting a finder's fee as a
matter of law. It is undisputed that Sachs was not
licensed in Utah as a real estate broker at the time he
claims to have solicited Jackson as a buyer for
UPCM. Defendants contend that, because UPCM's
only significant asset was its real property holdings
and its primary activities were the development and
marketing of that real property, the sale of 100% of
UPCM's stock falls within UREBA's definition of
real estate and bars Sachs from collecting a
commission on the sale. This is an issue of first
impression in Utah and has been treated variously by
the courts that have considered it. Based on the
language and history of the Utah statute, the longheld distinction between real and personal property,
and the practical application of the Act, we hold that
UREBA does not bar Sachs's claim.
\ 34 UREBA includes both civil and criminal
penalties for those acting as a principal real estate
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broker without a license. First, under the civil prong
ofUREBA,
[n]o person may bring or maintain an action in any
court of this state for the recovery of a commission,
fee, or compensation for any act done or service
rendered which is prohibited under [UREBA] to
other than licensed principal brokers, unless the
person was duly licensed as a principal broker at
the time of the doing of the act or rendering the
service.
Utah Code Ann. S 61-2-18 (2006) (emphasis
added).
% 35 Second, the criminal prong of UREBA
prohibits any person 'from Mengag[ing] in the
business, act[ing] in the capacity of, advertis[ing], or
assuming] to act as a principal real estate broker ...
within this state without a license." Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-2-1 (2006). A "[principal real estate broker" or
"principal broker" is defined to include any person
"who, with the expectation of receiving valuable
consideration, assists or directs in the procurement of
prospects for or the negotiation of," Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-2- 2(12)(d). certain transactions involving "real
estate," id. § 61-2- 2(12)(a)(i). TFN121 When read
together, these sections bar a person from
maintaining a commission claim for procuring a
buyer for real estate unless he was licensed at the
time he engaged in the acts. IFN131 See Utah Code
Ann. § § 62-2-1(1). -2(12), -18(1); Andalex Res..
Inc. v. Myers. 871 P.2d 1041. 1045 (Utah
Ct.App. 1994) (noting that UREBA provides that "(1)
if a party brings an action in a Utah court, (2) for
compensation, (3) for acts resulting in the sale or
exchange of real estate, (4) he or she must have the
*673 requisite broker license in order to recover the
commission").
FN12. The transactions include, but are not
limited to, those in which any person "sells
or lists for sale, buys, exchanges, or auctions
real estate, options on real estate, or
improvements on real estate with the
expectation
of
receiving
valuable
consideration." Utah Code Ann. § 61-22(12)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
FN13. Although the language of UREBA
speaks in terms of real estate brokers, the
statute's prohibitions apply with equal force
to the activities of real estate finders. See
CJ. Realty. Inc. v. Willed 758 P.2d 923. 926
(Utah CtApp. 1988) (holding that Utah's real
estate licensing statutes and statute of frauds
apply equally tofindersand brokers).
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f 36 "Real estate" is defined by UREBA to
"include[ ] leaseholds and business opportunities
involving real property.'1 Utah Code Ann. § 61-22(14) (emphasis added). The phrase "business
opportunities involving real property" is not,
however, defined within the Act. Defendants argue
that the sale of UPCM to Capital falls within this
definition. In reaching this conclusion, Defendants
assume that the proper inquiry is whether the ongoing
business being conveyed engages in commercial
activities involving real property. In contrast, Sachs
argues that the sale of UPCM fell outside UREBA's
definition of real estate because only stock was sold.
f 37 "When we interpret a statute, our 'primary goal
... is to give effect to the legislative intent, as
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve.' " Utah
State Tax Comm'n v. Stevenson. 2006 UT 84.1 32.
150 P.3d 521 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Holm. 2006 UT 31. % 16. 137 P.3d 726). We reach
this goal by first looking "to the plain language of a
statute to determine its meaning, and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same
chapter and related chapters." Id, (citation and
quotations omitted). Only uponfindingthat the plain
language is ambiguous do we proceed to "look to
other interpretive tools." M_ (quotations omitted).
f 38 The plain language of section 61-2-2 of the
Utah Code defines " 'Real Estate' [to] include[ ]
leaseholds and business opportunities involving real
property." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14). Neither
the term "business opportunity" nor "business
opportunity involving real property" is further
defined in the chapter. Nevertheless, it is our task to
give each word meaning, if possible. See State v.
Barrett. 2005 UT 88. <f 29. 127 P.3d 682 ("We
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly
and give effect to each terna according to its ordinary
and accepted meaning." (quotations omitted)).
Defendants contend that the proper inquiry is whether
the ongoing business engages in commercial
activities involving real property. Had the legislature
defined real estate to include businesses involving
real property, we would agree that UREBA is
applicable. The plain language of the statute,
however, includes only business opportunities. See
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2- 2(14). And Defendants'
interpretation would render the word "opportunities"
meaningless, something we must avoid when
possible. TEN 141 When we consider the plain
language of the Act in its entirety, however, it is
unclear from that language alone whether Sachs was
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required to comply with UREBA when finding a
buyer for all of UPCM's stock.
FN14. "Determining the legislature's intent
requires that 'we seek to render all parts [of
the statute] relevant and meaningful, and we
accordingly avoid interpretations that will
render portions of a statute superfluous or
inoperative.' " Carter v. University of Utah
Med Ctr.. 2006 UT 78, f 9. 150 R3d 467
(alteration in original) (quoting Hall v.
Department ofCorr.. 2001 UT 34, % 15, 24
P.3d 9581
f 39 Although the plain language of the Act is
ambiguous, we nevertheless find Defendants'
interpretation conflicts with the legislature's intent as
evidenced by the history of section 61-2-2. IPN151
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2- 2. Prior to 1985, the
term "business opportunity" was defined in UREBA
to "mean[ ] an existing business, a business and its
good will, a business franchise, or any combination
of them." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2- 2(5) (Supp.1983)
(amended 1985). However, in 1985, the Utah
Legislature deleted this definition from the chapter.
See Real Estate Amendments, ch. 162, § 2, 1985
Utah Laws 308, 309. We assume, therefore, that the
legislature intended to redefine the phrase "business
opportunities" to no longer mean existing businesses,
businesses and their good will, or business franchises.
See Sindt v. Retirement Bd.. 2007 UT 16, ^ 13, 570
Utah Adv. Rep. 71 ("We may not ignore the
legislature's decision to remove the term."). Indeed,
the omission of this language "logically can mean
nothing but that *674 the legislature's purpose
deliberately was to remove" those terms from the
definition. IcL Thus, prior to 1985 it may have been
proper, as Defendants urge, to substitute the terms
"existing business" for the phrase "business
opportunities" in the definition of real estate and then
to inquire whether the existing business's activities
involved real property. However, since the 1985
amendments, this inquiry is no longer appropriate.
Instead, the proper inquiry is to examine the specific
character of the business opportunity and to
determine whether that opportunity involved real
property.
FN15. Upon finding that the plain language
of a statute is ambiguous, we are free to
"look to other interpretive tools." Utah State
Tax Comm'n v. Stevenson. 2006 UT 84, %
32, 150P.3d521 (quotations omitted).
f 40 Here, the business opportunity at issue is the

purchase of all of UPCM's capital stock. UPCM, as
the surviving entity in the merger between UPCM
and CGP Acquisitions, Inc., retained its corporate
structure and all of its assets and liabilities, including
its real property. Thus, no real estate changed hands
as a result of the transaction. Stock or shares in a
corporation are generally considered personal
property
FFN161 and represent only "[t]he
shareholders' essential right to share in the profits and
in the distribution of assets on liquidation in
proportion to their interest in the enterprise." James
D. Cox, Thomas Lee Hazen, & F. Hodge O'Neal, 1
Corporations § 7.2 (2002). This interest "is in no
sense an individual right in specific property" of the
corporation; instead, " [shareholders are in the
position of claimants against the corporation with an
expectation of sharing in the profits and a right to
distribution of residual assets upon winding up." Id.;
cf. MacKav v. Hardv. 896 P.2d 626. 629 n. 4 (Utah
1995) (describing shareholder's interest in corporate
assets as only an equitable interest).
FN16. An exception to the general rule
arises with respect to stock in a mutual
irrigation corporation, which has been held
to represent an interest in real property. See
Salt Lake City Cow, v. Cahoon, 879 P.2d
248.252 (Utah 1994).
ri8iri91f20ir211 f 41 Because a corporation exists
as a distinct legal entity, when the corporation
acquires property, the title vests in it as a separate
entity distinct from its shareholders. Utah has long
recognized that "[a] corporate entity [is] separate and
apart from its stockholders" even where a single or
small group of stockholders own a controlling
interest in the corporation. JTN171 National Am. Life
Ins. Co. v. Bainum. 28 Utah 2d 45, 497 P.2d 854.
855-56 (1972): see also Transamerica Cash Reser\>e.
Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water. Inc., 789 P.2d 24. 26
(Utah 1990) (discussing legal separation of
shareholder and corporation);
12B Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §
5771 (perm. ed. 2000) ("The owner of a majority, or
all or nearly all of the stock of a corporation, whether
an individual, a collection of individuals, or another
corporation, does not own the property of the
corporation."). Likewise, "[w]hen a stockholder sells
his stock, he is selling his proprietary interest in a
going concern and not an interest in the corporate
assets." [FN181 Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d
1233, 1239 (6th Cir.1977): cf. Utah Code Ann. §
16-10a-102(33) (2005) (defining "shares" in a
corporation to "mean[ ] the units into which the
proprietary interests in a corporation are divided").
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FN17. UPCM was a public corporation and
its shares were traded on the New York
Stock Exchange.

Prufrock Rests.. Inc.. 757 S.W.2d 804, 805- 06
(Tex.Ct.App. 1988) (noting that when there is "no
assignment of [corporate] assets, but instead ... a sale
of capital stock" that the transaction is for a sale of
personalty, not realty).

FN18. The distinctions between corporate
stock and asset purchases are well
recognized. Generally speaking, when all
the assets of an ongoing business are
purchased, "the purchaser does not acquire
the liabilities of the corporation as a stock
purchaser would." Bertha v. Remv Int'L
Inc..
414
RSrop.2d
869.
877
(E.D.Wis.2006): see also Decius v. Action
Collection Serv.. Inc.. 2004 UT App 484. %
8.105 P.3d 956. Additionally, the purchaser
in an asset transaction takes legal title to the
property, i.e., "title to property transfers
from one party to another [. Conversely,] in
a
stock
purchase
transaction
the
corporation's assets remain titled in the
corporation's name." Bertha, 414 F.Supp.2d
at 877. Because the sale of UPCM to
Capital was accomplished exclusively
through the sale of stock and involved no
corporate assets, we do not address the
applicability of Utah's real estate licensing
provisions to a business opportunity
accomplished through an asset transfer.

f
43 In reaching this result, we join those
jurisdictions that recognize a distinction between the
sale of assets and the sale of stock for purposes of
applying statutes regulating the activities of real
estate brokers. See Gruber v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
899 F.2d 1366, 1368-75 (3d Cir.1990) (interpreting
Pennsylvania law and finding that sale of stock
would be exempted from real estate licensing
requirements), cited with approval by Winthrop &
Co. v. Milgrom, 447 Pa.Super. 140, 668 A.2d 557,
560-61 (1995). TFN191 In Gruber, the Third Circuit
reasoned
that
"commercial
transactions"
characterized by the purchase of shares in an existing
corporation through stock acquisitions "would be
distorted if the corporate form of sale were ignored,
particularly when it is recognized that the title and
ownership of whatever real estate may be involved in
the sale remains within the corporate body, under the
corporate name, and never changes hands." [FN201
Id. at 1374. We agree that this long recognized
principle should not be ignored lightly, nor without
clear direction from the Utah Legislature.

r221 \ 42 Applying the foregoing principles, we
hold that Capital gained only a "proprietary interest
in a going concern and not an interest in [UPCM's
real property] assets." Owens, 568 F.2d at 1239.
UPCM continued to own, possess, and control the
real property throughput and following the merger
transaction. See, e.g., *675Utah Code Ann. § 1610A-1106(b) (2005) ( "The title to all real estate and
other property owned by each corporation party to
the merger is transferred to and vested in the
surviving corporation without reversion or
impairment."). Thus, even though UPCM, as an
ongoing business, exists for the sole purpose of
owning and dealing in real estate, Sachs did not find
a participant in a business opportunity involving real
property because
[s]hares of stock, which represent the holder's
partial but undivided ownership of the corporation,
constitute a property interest quite distinct from the
capital or tangible assets of the corporation.... The
fact that the entire capital may be invested in real
estate does not change the character of the shares
of the corporation as personal property.
Richard A. Lord, 17 Williston on Contracts § 51:2
(4th ed.2006) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Evans v.

FN19. See also, e.g., Abramson v. Gulf
Coast Jewelry & Specialty Co., 445 F.2d
802, 803 (5th Cir.1971) (per curiam)
(finding that sale of stock fell outside
Alabama's
real
estate
licensing
requirements); Bertlia, 414 F.Supp.2d at
877-81 (finding Wisconsin's real estate
licensing provisions inapplicable to sale of
corporate stock); Cambridge Co. v. Arizona
Lawn Sprinklers, Inc., 166 Ariz. 269, 801
P.2d 504. 506 (Ct.App. 1990) (noting that "if
a purchaser had acquired [the business's]
corporate stock or if the transaction had
involved a merger or consolidation, [the
broker] could have legally participated in the
transaction without holding a real estate
license"); Frier v. Terry. 230 Ark. 302. 323
S.W.2d 415, 419 (1959) ("[T]he mere fact
the corporation or corporations own
buildings situated on realty did not
necessitate the holding by [the broker] of a
real estate license in order to claim a
commission on the sale of corporate
stock."); Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury
Group. Inc., 403 Mass. 291, 528 NJE.2d
1176, 1177 (1988) ("We accept that the
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sellers would have owed the full
commission ... if corporate stock (and not
assets) had been sold.");
Moody v.
Hurricane Creek Lumber Co., 290 Or. 729,
625 P.2d 1306. 1310-11(1981) (holding that
sale of stock of ongoing corporation was not
calculated to result in the sale of real estate,
and therefore fell outside real estate
licensing requirements); Evans v. Prufrock
Rests.. Inc.. 757 S.W.2d 804. 805-06
(Tex.CtApp.1988) (same).
FN20. Defendants argue that Gruber v.
Owens-Illinois, Inc.. 899 R2d 1366 (3d
Cir.1990). represents a distinct minority
position. However, careful reading of the
cases that have expressly considered the
distinction between stock and asset
purchases suggests that the courts are more
evenly divided.
Regardless of which
position boasts the higher number of
decisions, for the reasons stated in this
opinion, we conclude that the Utah
Legislature did not intend UREBA to apply
to the sale of corporate stock.
I 44 We acknowledge that some jurisdictions have
interpreted similar acts of their legislatures as
including the sale of a business through a stock
transfer. See, e.g., Coonev v. Ritter Trans.. Inc., 939
F.2d 81. 84-88 (3d Cir.1991) (finding New Jersey
licensing act applicable to sale of stock); Shochet
Secur.. Inc. v. First Union Corp.. 663 F.Supp. 1035.
1037 (S.DJFla.1987) (finding sale of stock within
Florida's licensing provisions); All Points Traders.
Inc. v. Barrinston Assoc, 211 CaLApp.3d 723. 259
CaLRptr. 780. 786 (1989) (holding that real estate
broker's license is required when negotiating the sale
of 100% of corporate stock); *616Lieff v. Medco
Prof. Servs. Corp.. 973 P.2d 1276. 1278
(Colo.Ct.App. 1998) (same): Everett v. Goodloe. 268
Ga.App. 536. 602 S.E.2d 284. 289 (2004) (same);
Shortt v. Knob City Inv. Co., 58 N.C.App. 123. 292
S.E.2d 737. 740 (1982) (same): Schmitt v. Coad. 24
Wash.App. 661. 604 P.2d 507. 510 (1979) (same). In
some instances, there are statutory differences that
support a contrary approach. fFN211
FN21. The Colorado definition of real estate
broker extends to transactions involving a
business, a business opportunity, or any
interest therein. See Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. §
12-61-101(2)(i) (West 2006) (emphasis
added). In contrast, the Utah Legislature
deleted the reference to an interest in an
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"existing business" from the definition of
business opportunity in UREBA in 1985.
See Real Estate Amendments, ch. 162, § 2,
1985 Utah Laws 308, 309.
I 45 For example, California has held that a stock
transfer is subject to its real estate broker licensing
requirements. See All Points Traders, 259 Cal.Rptr.
at 786 (holding that real estate broker's license is
required when negotiating the sale of 100% of a
corporation's stock). Historically, California had
separate licensing requirements for business
opportunity transactions and real estate transactions.
See id. at 782. However, due to confusion "as to
whether a business opportunity broker's license, a
real estate license, or both were required, when a
business opportunity transaction involved real
estate," in 1965, the California Legislature "merged
the real estate and business opportunity licenses
under the supervision of [California's] Department of
Real Estate." IcL. From its inception the business
opportunities licensing requirements did not exempt
incorporated businesses. JFN221 See id^ Therefore,
after the merger of the licensing requirements,
California courts continued to apply the real estate
licensing requirements to the sale of businesses
involving the transfer of stock whether or not those
opportunities involved real property. See id^ The
legislative trends noted in California, however, are
inapposite to those experienced in Utah.
FN22. California's real estate licensing
statute is also broader than UREBA because
it applies to all business opportunities, while
Utah's applies only to business opportunities
involving real property. Compare Cal. Bus.
&Prof.Code. § 10131(a) (Deering 2007),
with Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14).
f 46 In 1921, Utah enacted its first statute regulating
real estate brokers and real estate salespeople. See
An Act to Define Real Estate Brokers and Real Estate
Salesmen, ch. 110, § § 1-16, 1921 Utah Laws 304,
304-09. At that time, the enforcement of the act was
entrusted to the state securities commission. See id. §
4. The legislature amended the Act in 1939 to
incorporate a definition for "real estate" that included
"leaseholds and other interests not less than
leaseholds" within the reach of the Act. Act of March
7, 1939, ch. 106, § 1, 1939 Utah Laws 140, 140. In
1963, the legislature again expanded the scope of the
Act by amending the definition of real estate to
include "leaseholds and business opportunities." An
Act Relating to Real Estate Brokers, ch. 146, § 1,
1963 Utah Laws 521, 522.
Simultaneously,
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"business opportunities" was defined to "include an
existing business, business and the good will attached
thereto or any one or a combination thereof." Id. At
this point, Utah, like California, merged the licensing
requirements for both business opportunity brokers
and real estate brokers under the supervision of the
securities commission.
f 47 The legislature enacted the Utah Uniform
Securities Act (UUSA) in 1963, which provided for
the registration of broker-dealers, agents, investment
advisors, and securities. See Uniform Securities Act,
ch. 145, § 1, 1963 Utah Laws 494, 494-521.
Initially, enforcement of both the real estate broker's
licensing act and the UUSA was the responsibility of
the state securities commission. In 1983, the scope of
the real estate licensing provisions was extended, by
amending the definition of real estate to "include [ ]
leaseholds, business opportunities, and all timeshare
interests (including but not limited to fee simple, club
membership, limited partnership, and beneficiary
interest in a time share trust)." Division of Real
Estate Amendments-Sunset Review, ch. 257, § 1,
1983 Utah Laws 1020, 1021. But, at that same time
the Utah Legislature formed the Division of Real
Estate within the Department of Business Regulation,
effectively removing *677 real estate broker
licensing and enforcement from the securities
commission. See id. § 5.
f 48 This reorganization split real estate licensing
and enforcement from securities enforcement.
Shortly thereafter, the legislature began collapsing
the definition of real estate within the real estate
licensing statute. In 1985, the Utah Legislature
contracted the scope of the real estate broker's act in
two ways. First, it narrowed the definition of real
estate by including the limiting phrase "involving real
property." See Real Estate Amendments, ch. 162, §
2, 1985 Utah Laws 308, 309 (amending definition of
real estate to include "leaseholds, business
opportunities, and all timeshare interests ... involving
real property " (emphasis added)). Second, it deleted
"existing business, business and the good will
attached thereto or any one of a combination thereof
from the expansive definition of "business
opportunity." Id. When taken together, these changes
signal the Utah Legislature's intent, unlike California,
to narrow the scope of the real estate licensing statute
and to recognize securities transactions as a distinct
regulatory subject. TFN231
FN23. The intent to distinguish securities
transactions from real estate transactions is
also apparent in the legislature's creation of

exemptions that effectively abolish the need
for dual licensing in transactions in which
real estate is a necessary element of a
security. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-3(3)
(2006) (exempting licensed securities
brokers from the real estate licensing
requirements where the real estate in the
transaction "is a necessary element of a
'security' "); cf. id. § 61-l-13(l)(c)(ii)(G)
(2006) (exempting licensed real estate
brokers from the licensing requirements of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act when the
transaction is for a "bond or other evidence
of indebtedness secured by a ... mortgage or
deed of trust, or by an agreement for the sale
of real estate").
Although it is unclear whether Sachs is a
licensed securities broker, Defendants did
not seek summary judgment on that ground.
Thus, resolution of whether Sachs's claims
are impacted by the application of federal or
state securities laws is beyond the scope of
this decision. See Payable Accounting
Corp. v. McKinlev. 667 P.2d 15. 18 (Utah
1983) (discussing securities transactions
falling within scope of Federal and Utah
securities laws); cf. Bertha. 414 F.Supp.2d
at 877 (noting that legislative history
suggests that stock sales are not covered by
Wisconsin's real estate licensing statutes
because they are "specifically governed by
securities laws"); Sergeant v. Leonard, 312
N.W.2d 54L 547-48 (Iowa 1981)
(recognizing applicability of Iowa's blue sky
laws to transfer of business through sale of
its common stock).
<j[ 49 Furthermore, the purposes of UREBA are not
advanced by requiring a Utah real estate broker's
license for finding a buyer for 100% of the common
stock of a publicly traded company. UREBA was
adopted "for the protection of members of the public
who rely on licensed real estate brokers and
salespeople to perform tasks that require a high
degree of honesty and integrity." Global Recreation,
Inc. v. Cedar Hills Dev. Co.. 614 P 2d 155, 158 (Utah
1980) (finding that the purpose of UREBA is "not to
protect real estate developers who seek relief from
their own contractual obligations"). Further, this is
not a case like Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Mvers, 871
P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct.App.1994), where we held that
the purpose of the Act cannot override its express
statutory terms to exempt from regulation a
transaction unambiguously covered by the Act. See
id. at 1045 & n. 6. As discussed previously, the
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language of UREBA is ambiguous and we may,
therefore, look to "the purpose the statute was meant
to achieve" in interpreting its language. See Utah
State Tax Comm'n v. Stevenson, 2006 UT 84, f 32.
150 P.3d 521. Thus, interpreting UREBA to have
limited application is consistent with the purpose of
the Act because it is highly unlikely that
unsophisticated members of the public will be party
to a merger which results in one corporation
purchasing 100% of the common stock of another.
\ 50 We also reject Defendants' argument that our
decision today elevates form over substance.
Essentially, Defendants contend that the
sale of all the stock of [a] corporation [is] in legal
effect a sale of all of its assets, and the mere fact
that the parties found it more convenient to transfer
all of the stock rather than to make a conveyance of
its assets does not change the substance of the
transaction.
Everett v. Goodloe, 268 Ga.App. 536, 602 S.E.2d
284. 289 (2004) (quoting Kingston Dev. Co. v.
Kenerlv, 132 Ga.App. 346, 208 S.E.2d 118 (1974)).
We cannot agree that *678 the sale of the stock of a
corporation is legally equivalent to a sale of its assets.
Nor do we believe that the distinction between the
two types of transactions elevates form over
substance.
^ 5 1 Utah has long recognized the importance of the
separate legal identity of corporations and has been
unwilling to permit parties to ignore those
distinctions. See Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Steele
Ranch 533 P.2d 888. 891 (Utah 1975) ("[W]here
persons organize[ ] a corporation to acquire the
advantages flowing from its existence as a separate
entity, they should not be able to disregard the
corporate entity to gain an advantage for another
purpose."). Here, Capital chose to structure its
acquisition of UPCM as a stock rather than an asset
purchase. " '[T]he difference in a buyer's assumption
of liabilities when entering into a stock purchase
agreement versus an asset purchase agreement is
well-known in the business community.' " Bertha v.
Remv Int'l Inc., 414 RSupp.2d 869, 881
(E.D.Wis.2006) (quoting Columbia Propane, 2003
WI 38. f 29. 261 Wis.2d 70. 661 N.W.2d 776).
Defendants should not be permitted to enjoy the
benefits of UPCM's separate corporate structure for
some purposes while also claiming it elevates form
over substance in an attempt to defeat Sachs's claim
for a finder's fee. See Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d at 891.
TFN241
FN24. Defendants' position also raises
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additional questions, including the amount
of real property that must be owned by the
subject corporation and the number of shares
that must be transferred before the licensing
requirements of UREBA would be triggered.
For example, would the sale of a single
share of UPCM stock over the New York
Stock Exchange require a Utah real estate
license? See, e.g., Coonev v. Ritter Tramp.,
Inc., 939 F.2d 81. 88 (3d Cir.1991)
(allowing an unlicensed finder of a buyer for
corporate stock to recover a commission "on
so much of the purchase price as is
attributable to the personalty" of the target
corporation);
Thomas v. Daubs, 291
Ill.App.3d 682. 226 Ill.Dec. 15. 684 N.E.2d
1011. 1015 (1997) (allowing an unlicensed
finder of a buyer for corporate stock to
recover a commission "when real estate is
only incidental to the entire transaction");
March Group, Inc. v. Bellar, 908 S.W.2d
956.
958-60
(Tenn.Ct. App. 1995)
(addressing whether stock transaction
conveying a "controlling interest" in a
corporation with 43% of its assets in real
property triggered real estate licensing
requirements and recognizing a presumption
that a stock purchase is incidental unless real
estate is the principal corporate asset).
IV. Statute of Frauds
f23ir241 f 52 As a separate ground for summary
judgment, Defendants argue that Sachs's claim to a
finder's fee is unenforceable under the Utah Statute of
Frauds because there is no written memorandum of
the alleged agreement. Defendants rely on Utah
Code section 25-5-4, which provides that "every
agreement authorizing or employing an agent or
broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation," is "void unless the agreement, or
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in
writing, signed by the party to be charged with the
agreement[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1 )(e).
Defendants argue that the definition of "real estate" in
UREBA, which includes business opportunities
involving real property, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-22(14). is equally applicable to Utah's statute of
frauds. Assuming, without deciding, that the statute
of frauds utilizes the same definition of "real estate"
as UREBA, Sachs's alleged finder's fee agreement
falls outside the reach of that statute for the same
reasons that UREBA is inapplicable. Specifically,
section 25-5-4 of Utah's statute of frauds does not
apply to brokerage agreements for the sale of
exclusively personal property. And, as discussed in
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more detail above, the stock in a corporation is
personalty, not realty. See Evans v. Prufrock Rests..
Inc.. 757 S.W.2d 804. 805-06 (Tex.CtApp. 1988V
This is true even where, as here, the corporation's
only significant asset is its real property because
ownership of stock is not the equivalent of an
ownership interest in the corporation's assets. See
Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors. 282 U.S. 19. 24.
51 S.Ct. 15. 75 L.Ed. 140 (1930). Therefore,
agreements to broker corporate stock for
compensation do not fall within the scope of section
25-5-4(H(e). HFN251
FN25. Indeed, Utah Code section 70A-8112 specifically bars the application of
Utah's statute of frauds to contracts for the
sale or purchase of securities. See Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-8-112 (2002).
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exclusively in corporate stock. Likewise, section 255-4(l)(e) of Utah's statute of frauds does not apply to
transactions dealing with personal, as opposed to real
property.
f 55 Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse and
remand in part.
f 56 I CONCUR: WILLIAM A. THORNE JR.,
Judge.
f 57 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: RUSSELL W.
BENCH, Presiding Judge.
163 P.3d 662, 578 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2007 UT App
169
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*679 f 53 This interpretation is consistent with this
court's decision in Mackintosh v. Hampshire, 832
P.2d 1298 (Utah Ct.App.1992). In that case, the
plaintiff sued to enforce an oral contract for services
in exchange for a 10% interest in the profits of a
partnership's real estate developments. See id. at
1299. The partnership argued that the agreement was
barred by the statute of frauds. We disagreed,
reasoning that the plaintiff was claiming an interest
only in the profits of the real estate project. See id. at
1301. Thus, the claim was not for an interest in the
real property itself and therefore did not fall within
the statute of frauds. See id. at 1302. Similarly, the
purchase of the shares of UPCM gave Capital an
interest in only the profits and losses of the
corporation and did not represent any legal interest in
its real property assets. Thus, the statute of frauds
does not bar Sachs's claim to afinder'sfee.
CONCLUSION
f 54 Under Utah law, an express contract for a
finder's fee is not enforceable where the parties have
not had a meeting of the minds on the essential term
of the commission or fee to be paid, and summary
judgment was properly granted on Sachs's claim for
an express finder's fee agreement.
However,
summary judgment was improperly granted with
respect to Sachs's claim for contract implied in fact
because the disputed facts could support the
conclusion that Defendants requested performance,
Sachs expected to be compensated, and Defendants
knew or should have known that Sachs expected to
be paid. Additionally, Sachs's claims for contract
implied in fact and contract implied in law are not
barred by UREB A because the Act does not require a
real estate license to engage in transactions dealing
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TRANSCRIPT OF
UTAH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Floor Debate on Second Substitute House Bill 284 on February 22,1985
Clerk: Second Substitute House Bill 284, Real Estate Amendments by Richard J. Bradford, "Be
it enacted by the legislature of the State of Utah."
Speaker of the House:

Representative Bradford.

Representative Bradford:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Representatives, this bill—the initiative

for it came from the Department of Business Regulation, the Real Estate Division. It is
an attempt to clarify and clean up the existing statute regulating the real estate industry in
Utah. I won't burden you with the details, all the details, of the bill. I had handed out to
your desks a summary of the important issues that were modified as a result of this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I'd like to yield to Representative Moody to make a floor amendment, if I
might.
Speaker of the House:

Representative Bradford, we do not have a formal adoption record of

Second Substitute House Bill 284. Now if that is what you are speaking to, we'd need a
formal motion, if that is, are we at the Second Substitute?
Representative Bradford:
Speaker of the House:

Will you make that motion?

Representative Bradford:
Speaker of the House:

Yes, we are.

I would make that Motion.

It is moved and seconded that we substitute Second Substitute House

Bill 284 for, I guess, the First Substitute House Bill 284. Those in favor, say aye?
Voice Vote:

Aye.

Speaker of the House:

Those opposed. Motion carries. Representative Moody.

Representative Moody: Thank you. Representatives, in your book there's a pink sheet. This is
simply language to handle the situation where agents are filling out earnest monies and
the like and just simply clarifies that those forms are approved by the Real Estate
Commission, Attorney General and whether or not they can be handled through legal
counsel.
Speaker of the House:

Representative Dahl. Not to the bill? Seeing no other light,

Representative Dahl?
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Representative Dahl:

I have another amendment. I thought Craig was mziking an

amendment. So I have another amendment.
Speaker of the House:

Okay, Representative Dahl. What did you make an amendment? Fm

sorry, I didn't track that. What's the amendment? I'm sorry I didn't track that.
Representative Moody?
Representative Moody: The amendment is on, is in the pink sheet on your book, page 26, line
5 after "Lessor", delete "or", page 26, line 6 after "Lessee" and before the period insert,
"or any legal counsel provided by any legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate
Commission and Attorney General have not approved a specific form necessary to that
transaction."
Speaker of the House:

To that motion to amend, representatives? Are their others who would

like so to speak to the motion to amend? Representative Shmutz, to the motion to
amend?
Representative Shmutz:

To the bill.

Speaker of the House:

Okay, others to the motion to amend? Seeing none, I'll call for the

question? Those in favor, say aye?
Voice Vote:

Aye.

Speaker of the House:

Those opposed. Motion carries. I guess I go back to Representative

Bradford.
Representative Bradford:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I won't belabor this, representatives, but

the bill is a consensus bill that initiative came from the Department thait was charged with
the responsibility for the regulation of the industry. It has had several hearings before
interested industry groups. It had an extensive hearing before the committee the other
night and there have been extensive amendments made to the bill. As it stands, I believe
it is an excellent effort to clean up language and to clarify ambiguous language in the
current statute. So I would encourage your support.
Speaker of the House:

Thank you. Representative Dahl.

Representative Dahl:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I move to make an amendment that is in

your book on the pink sheet, page 22, line 20. This is an amendment 1 hat was really
agreed on in committee, but we didn't have the proper language. And what it does is
they've made some, in my opinion, some very extensive cease-and-desist powers and
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other penalties to be able to take into court and all this says is that, it refers to the Equal
Access and Justice Bill that we passed a couple of years ago, that says if your found
innocent, then they have to pay your attorney and court costs. And I would ask for your
support of this.
Speaker of the House:

Okay, is there a second? Shmutz second it. The floor amendment

under Representative Dahl's name. To that motion to amend? Representative Shmutz, is
it to that motion?
Representative Bradford:
Speaker of the House:

Mr. Speaker?

Representative Bradford?

Representative Bradford:

Could I ask Representative Dahl? Is the language that you are

referring, the language that was discussed in committee in terms of the reference to the
existing statute?
Representative Dahl:

Yes, I ask Avery to bring this down like what we talked about.

Representative Bradford:

As a sponsor, I would not oppose this amendment.

Speaker of the House:

Alright, others to the motion to amend? Representative Garbett?

Seeing no other lights, then I'll call question on the motion to amend as found on the pink
sheet, Donna Dahl's amendment page 22, line 20, as you can see there. To that motion.
Those in favor say aye?
Voice vote:

Aye.

Speaker of the House:

Those opposed. The motion carries. The bill will be further

amended. Representative Shmutz?
Representative Shmutz:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Will the sponsor yield to a question?

Representative Bradford:

Yes.

Representative Shmutz:

Representative Bradford. I'm very confused. On page 7, at the top

of the page, the new language it refers to the authority of the commission and it deals
with the approvals of curriculum, then it goes into the provision of due process, and then
back to the approval of instructions, what does due process have to do with the
commissioner's power in this relationship?
Representative Bradford:

Well, I may be confused also. Let me just look at it for a moment.

Speaker of the House:

Representative Shmutz, did you have a question?
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Representative Shmutz:

Yeah I sure do, but I can't really understand it. Representative

Dahl has been trying to explain it, but I'm not getting it.
Speaker of the House:

Representative Dahl, do you have an answer for Representative

Shmutz to proceed?
Representative Dahl:

Yes, I can answer that. This, this is to do with real estate schools

and in those amendments we gave them three areas where they could make rules
pertaining to real estate school. And one of them is that they can make some rules for the
due process of law in the event that they go in and a school and they are unhappy with
what a school is doing and so they say, we are going to close you down. They have to
with rules and regulations with this language make some form of due process, so that
those people have a chance to come in and be heard and explain or be told why they are
being put out of business. And that is what we are doing by that amendment.
Representative Shmutz:

By the school? Are the individual dealers?

Representative Dahl:

There are schools, under the law they have to have so many hours

of education before they can get a real estate license. These schools that keep that
education, they've been given those schools a lot of problems, and so we put this
language in there saying these are the only specific areas where they can make rules and
regulations for. Is those three specific areas. And one of them is the due process, so they
can be heard if they try to put them out of business.
Representative Shmutz:

So this refers to any violation of this chapter?

Representative Dahl:

Well, but

Representative Shmutz:

Does this chapter only deal with those schools?

Representative Dahl:

No, but the previous paragraph does. If you look at the few

previous paragraphs, it talks about 90 hours and 120 hours of education that they have to
have in order to get a license.
Representative Shmutz:

But as I read this, you are talking about the whole real estate

chapter, not just the school.
Representative Dahl:

Well, it says, that's the only place in the chapter that refers to

education, so that is the only thing it can apply to.
Representative Shmutz:
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Speaker of the House:

Representative Garbett. Not to the amendment? I'll call for, we're

to the bill, Representative, is that what you'd like? Representative Garbett?
Representative Garbett:

I'd like to make an amendment, Speaker?

Speaker of the House:

Received.

Representative Garbett:

The amendment would be on page 26, line 2. Bracket out "the

closing of." Also, on line 5, after "counsel", put a bracket and then delete the language to
line 6 with another bracket after "Lessee" and before the period and also with that
amendment we'd have to delete the language that we just added from Representative
Moody. So, it now reads "the principal brokers and associate brokers may fill out any
documents associated with a real estate transaction and real estate licensees may fill out"
[you can't hear him well...]
Speaker of the House:

Try it again.

Representative Garbett:

"may fill out real estate forms prepared by legal counsel," period.

Speaker of the House:

Okay, it has been moved and seconded to that Motion.

Representative Garbett.
Representative Garbett:

Representative Moody's amendment was a good one, but it didn't

go far enough. We have a Division of Real Estate that licenses Real Estate Agents, the
language that is in there presently says we license them and we have them go to school
and we have them take a test, but we don't want them to do anything that pertains to their
business. My amendment would just say let them practice real estate. That is all it does.
It doesn't restrict them the way that the Division does.
Speaker of the House:

Others to the bill? Representative Jenkins.

Representative Jenkins:

To that motion?

Speaker of the House:

Yes, to that motion.

Representative Jenkins:

I speak in favor of that. Representative Garbett hit on it a little bit,

but just let me hit on it a little bit more. We require a Real Estate Broker and Associate
Broker to have 120 hours of schooling before he can even sit for a test. Then he has to sit
for a test and be tested on all items having to do with real estate law, all other kinds of
law and so forth. They should then be able to have to fill out any forms, only those
forms, with a real estate transaction. We're not saying any other forms, but to the real
estate transaction. And now we are saying that real estate licensees, salesman, ought to
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be able to fill out any form that a legal counsel, legal attorney has gone over and
approved. And that salesman also has to go to school. This just gives them the
opportunity to make, earn their livelihood without being encumbered unnecessarily. So
I'm in favor of this amendment.
Speaker of the House:

Others to the motion to amend.

Representative Bradford:

Mr. Speaker?

Speaker of the House:

Representative Bradford?

Representative Bradford:

I would have to speak against this amendment. The whole effort

behind the language in the bill relative to the authorization of Real Estate Agents to fill
out forms in connection with real estate transactions is an exception to the general rule
which says that if you are not a lawyer you can't practice law. This provides an
opportunity for those practitioners in the industry to in effect practice law in a very
limited defined area. And although this may sound as if I'm speaking against
practitioners in my own industry, I think it is important to recognize that the whole idea
of regulation is to protect the public interest and I believe by broadening this, the way this
amendment would do, it would go far beyond the intent or certainly the history that we
have had in the industry concerning the ability and the right of practitioners to in effect
practice law by creating documents for their own interests. Obviously, those of us in the
industry who consider ourselves reputable and professionals would not take advantage of
this, but unfortunately, there are those in the industry that could use this to the detriment
of the public, and so I would strongly oppose it and I'm sure I can speak for the
Department that they would strongly oppose this amendment as well.
Speaker of the House:

Okay. Representative Allen.

Representative Allen:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I favor this amendment, but I don't think

it's taken, well, as Representative Garbett said it allows us to do the things that we need
to do. And I think the public is protected. We, if there is any problem, if someone
creates a problem, then they are not licensed very long, because they can be brought in
and their license revoked, so the Division's got ways of policing this thing and we'll
watch it very closely. I favor this amendment.
Speaker of the House:
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Representative Garbett:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. We've left in prepared by legal counsel,

so real estate agents will not be practicing law. But the Division sends real estate agents
to school, tests them so they are competent, represents that to the public, but then in the
language that is in there presently says but we don't want you to do your job. We want to
tell you what you can fill out and what you can't. This amendment just simply lets real
estate agents practice real estate.
Speaker of the House:

Representatives, the motion is page 26, line 2, after the word

"with" delete the words "the closing of." Page 26, line 5 and 6, after the word "counsel"
delete the words, "of the Buyer, Seller, Lessor and Lessee." To that motion, those in
favor say aye?
Voice vote:

Aye.

Speaker of the House:

Those opposed [you hear a couple of voices]. The ayes have it.

The motion carries. The bill will be further amended. Others that would to speak to the
bill? Seeing no others. Representative Bradford?
Representative Bradford:

Legislators, I believe that the bill, as I've indicated before, is an

attempt to clarify and to clean up language in the statute. I believe it is an important bill
to the industry. I believe that the amendment that has just been passed, however, does
weaken that particular area and I'm not so sure that the Real Estate Division of the
Department will continue to support the bill, but I would encourage your support and
pass it here and let them deal with this amendment in the Senate.
Speaker of the House:

Now open on HB 284 as amended. It is a second substitute House

Bill 284 as amended. Voting is now closed on HB 284 as amended. HB 284, Second
Substitute House Bill 284 as amended. Having received 60 affirmative votes and 3
negative votes, passes the House to be transmitted to the Senate for its further action.
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TRANSCRIPT OF
UTAH STATE SENATE
Floor Debate on Second Substitute House Bill 284 on February 27,1985
President of the Senate: Second Substitute House Bill 284.
Clerk: Second Substitute House Bill 284, Real Estate Amendments by Representative Bradford.
President of the Senate:
Senator Overson:

Senator Overson?
Thank you, Mr. President. This bill comes from the Real Estate

Division. It has been worked out with the real estate industry and it is basically to amend
the real estate statutes to clarify some things we did back in 1983 with respect to the
establishing the three classes of licensing for brokers and also add some other definitions
so that the statute is clear. It further defines the Commission and Division role. It
clarifies their working relationship. It clarifies the license application language and also
it clarifies the issue of non-resident licenses. The current statute is quite ambiguous and
this cleans up that quite a bit. It clarifies the issue of fiduciary duty and also establishes
that forms provided by the Real Estate Commission, Office of the Attorney General, are
those which are to be used by real estate brokers. Are there any questions?
President of the Senate: Any questions for Senator Overson?
Senator Overson:
President of the Senate:

I move for the question.
Question has been called for. The question is shall Second

Substitute House Bill 284 pass?
[Voice vote was taken]
President of the Senate:

Second Substitute House Bill 284 shows 21 ayes and 1 nay, 7

being absent. Bill passes. To be signed by the President in open session and referred to
the House for their further action.
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